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WHO CARES WHAT THOMAS JEFFERSON
THOUGHT ABOUT PATENTS? REEVALUATING
THE PATENT "PRIVILEGE" IN
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Adam Mossofft

Conventional wisdom holds that American patents have always been
grants of special monopoly privileges lacking any justification in natural
rights philosophy-a belief based in oft-repeated citations to Thomas Jefferson's writings on patents. Using "privilege" as a fulcrum in its analysis,
this Article reveals that the history of early American patent law has been
widely misunderstood and misused. In canvassing primary historical
sources, including the Founders' writings, congressional reports, long-forgotten court decisions, and political and legal treatises, this Article explains
how patent rights were defined and enforced using the social contract doctrine and the labor theory of property of naturalrights philosophy. In the
antebellum years, patents were civil rights securing important property
rights-what natural-rights-influenced politicians and jurists called
"privileges."
This intellectual history situates the Copyright and Patent Clause, the
early patent statutes, and nineteenth-century patent case law within their
appropriatepolitical and constitutional context. In doing so, it resolves
many conundrums arisingfrom misinterpretation of the historical patent
privilege. Doctrinally, it explains why Congress and courts in the early nineteenth century expansively and liberally construedpatent rights, and did not
limit patents in the same way they narrowly construed commercial monopoly
grants such as bridgefranchises. It also exposes the nearly universal misuse
of history by lawyers and scholars who rely on Jefferson as an undisputed
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historical authority to critique expansive intellectualproperty protections today. Ultimately, the conventional wisdom is a historicalmyth that obscures
the early development of American patent law under the meaningful guidance of natural rights philosophy.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1966, the Supreme Court discovered that Thomas Jefferson
was the founder of American patent law. In Graham v. John Deere Co.,'
the Court first invoked Jefferson's words that the "embarrassment of
an exclusive patent" was a special legal privilege justified only because
these "monopolies of invention" served the "benefit of society." 2 Jefferson continued to make guest appearances in Court decisions for
1
2

383 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1966).
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 334-35 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903) [hereinafter Letter to Isaac McPherson].
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the next two decades,3 leading patent law scholars to remark recently
that Jefferson's "views . . . have proven influential, especially in the
Supreme Court."4 Following the Court's practice, intellectual property scholars, especially those engaged in the increasingly rancorous
debate over rights in digital content on the Internet, invoke Jefferson's words as an unassailable historical axiom. 5 Jefferson's hegemony over the history of American patent law is as indisputable as it is
wrong.
In usingJefferson as the sole source of early American patent law
policy, the Court and scholars have created a historical myth-what
this Article calls the 'Jeffersonian story of patent law." This conception of early American patent policy arguably results from the sidelining of the Copyright and Patent Clause 6 from many traditional
debates in constitutional law. 7 Whereas legal scholars have studied for
many years the historical record underlying other constitutional
clauses, such as the Commerce Clause, 8 the history of the Copyright
and Patent Clause remains largely unexplored. 9 Patents, and intellectual property rights generally, receive short shrift in standard legal histories,10 and even then historians recite by rote the standard line of
3 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 147 (1989); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980).
4
ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 8 (3d ed. 2002).
5 See infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (identifying scholars' substantial reliance on Jefferson).
6
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ....
To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
7 Two prominent constitutional law treatises do not discuss the Copyright and Patent
Clause. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2002); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988). The Copyright and Patent Clause is also
absent from other constitutional law hornbooks. See, e.g.,JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1986); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 215 (2004) (noting that

"constitutional law courses never focus upon the Progress Clause of the Constitution");
Paul M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension
and Intellectual Property as ConstitutionalPrperty, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2331 (2003) (noting
that the Copyright and Patent Clause "until very recently ... received little attention from
constitutional law scholars").
8
See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND
WAITE (1937); TRIBE, supra note 7, at 401-45; Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the
ConstitutionalConvention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432 (1941); Randy
E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001);
Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARv. L. REV. 1335
(1934).
9 Before the 1990s, Bruce Bugbee's and Frank Prager's works comprised almost all

citations to the history of American patent law. See, e.g., BRUCE W. BUOBEE, GENESIS OF
AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW (1967); Frank D. Prager, A History of IntellectualProp-

erty from 1545 to 1787, 26J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 711 (1944); Frank D. Prager, Proposalsfor the
Patent Act of 1790, 36J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 157 (1954).
10
There is no mention of patents or other intellectual property rights in MORTONJ.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977).

Lawrence Fried-

man spends only seven pages discussing patents in his famous study of American legal
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the Jeffersonian story of patent law. Lawrence Friedman, for instance,
states simply that "[m] onopoly was in bad odor in 1776, except for the
special case of the patent, which served as an incentive for technical
innovation."1'
Recently, lawyers and scholars began to focus their attention on
patent law history, but they view the historical record through a lens
cut by the Jeffersonian story of patent law. 12 In Eldred v. Ashcrofi,I' the
petitioner and his supporting amici relied on the Jeffersonian story of
patent law in arguing that Congress's 1998 extension of copyright
terms contradicted the limited status of copyright (and patent) privileges established in the early years of the republic.' 4 Scholars use the
Jeffersonian story of patent law as an undisputed descriptive baseline
for critiquing recent expansions in intellectual property rights, which
they call the "propertization" of intellectual property. 15 Furthermore,
professors and activists use it in criticizing the Supreme Court for being Janus-faced: the Court's expansive doctrinal developments in pat-

history. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 255-57, 435-38 (2d ed.

1985).
11
FRIEDMAN, supra note 10, at 255. Later, Friedman writes that "[t] he patent monopoly was in some regards an anomaly, in an expansive, free-market economy." Id. at 436.
12
See, e.g., EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2002); Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The AntiMonopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'V 909

(2002).
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
See Brief for Petitioners at 14-16, 24-28, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)
(No. 01-618), 2002 WL 32135676; Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8-13, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01618), 2002 WL 1041866; see also Ochoa & Rose, supra note 12, at 909 (noting that their
article was an expanded version of their amicus brief filed in Eldred).
15
See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, CabiningIntellectual Property Through a PropertyParadigm,
54 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (2004) (declaring that "[o]ne of the most revolutionary legal changes in
the past generation has been the 'propertization' of intellectual property," in which these
rights are viewed as "absolute property" and their "duration and scope... expand without
limit"); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 1331, 1343 (2004) (noting how it is "fashionable today" among intellectual property
scholars to believe that "the public domain stands in opposition to intellectual propertythat the public domain is a bulwark against propertization and an alternative to intellectual
property"); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REV.
873, 902 (1997) (book review) (concluding after a survey of increasing intellectual property protections that "the 'propertization' of intellectual property is a very bad idea"); see
also Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a
ChangingDirection in IntellectualProperty Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 398 (1989) (describing and critiquing the "more proprietarian and anti-dissemination attitude toward information than that which the law has previously displayed"). A legal historian recently noted
the historical claim of some intellectual property scholars lamenting "the 'propertization'
of the field" in which the "expansive language of property rights has displaced the traditional discourse of limited monopoly." Morton J. Horwitz, Conceptualizingthe Right of Access
to Technology, 79 WASH. L. REv. 105, 114 (2004).
13

14
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ent law 16 and in other intellectual property fields' 7 belie its alleged
commitment to its long-standing, historical policy in limiting these
special monopoly privileges. Lawrence Lessig thus faults the Court
today for failing to heed its own "long history of ...imposing limits on
Congress's power in the name of the Copyright and Patent Clause." 8
In this Article, I offer a modest challenge to these widely held
historical assumptions by exploring one aspect of the intellectual history of American patent law: the oft-repeated claim today that patents
have always been specially conferred legal "privileges." In addition to
Jefferson's belief that a patent was a special "gift of social law,"'19 there
are substantial references to patents as "privileges" in the early years of
the American republic. 20 On the basis of this historical evidence, Susan Sell asserts that the focus today on intellectual property rights "obscure[s] the fact that IP 'rights' are actually grants of privileges." 2'
Judge Giles S. Rich, regarded by many as "the founding father of modern patent law," 22 also believes "that patents for inventions were historically, and always will be, grants of privileges." 23 Such broadbrushed declarations that patents were merely special legal privileges
are wrong.
What is missing today in these oft-repeated historical claims is an
appreciation of the intellectual context of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries-an era dominated by the labor theory of property
16 See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-93 (1981) (holding that computer
programs are patentable subject matter); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309
(1980) (holding that a genetically engineered bacteria "plainly qualifies as patentable subject matter"). Until recently, the Federal Circuit played a central role in expanding patent
rights with the Supreme Court's salutary neglect. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375-77 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that business
methods are patentable subject matter), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
17 See, e.g., MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (holding peer-topeer file swapping network liable for indirect copyright infringement); Eldred, 537 U.S. at
204 (holding that Congress has the authority under the Copyright and Patent Clause to
extend copyright terms retroactively).
18
LESSIG, supranote 7,at 240; cf Eldred, 537 U.S. at 246 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (castigating the Eldred majority for ignoring the views of Madison, Jefferson, "and others in the
founding generation [who] warned against the dangers of monopolies").
19
Letter to Isaac McPherson, supra note 2, at 333.
20
This includes Supreme CourtJustices, such as Justice Joseph Story, see infra note 68
and accompanying text, and numerous other federal judges and Circuit Justices, see infra
note 183 and accompanying text.
21
SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 146 (2003) (citation omitted).
22
DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 24 (3d ed. 2004). Judge Rich
was "the principal architect of the 1952 Patent Act" and later served on the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the specialized appeals court created in 1982 with sole jurisdiction over patent cases. Id.
23 Giles S. Rich, Are Letters Patent Grants of Monopoly?, 15 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 239, 248
(1993); see also Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 382 (1945) (Douglas,J., dissenting)
(declaring that "[i]t is a mistake ... to conceive of a patent as but another form of private
property" because a "patent is a privilege").
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and the social contract theory of civil society. Recognizing this past
intellectual context is important in understanding history, if only because that context is radically different from the utilitarian and positivist paradigm that dominates our political and legal discourse
today. 24 To move from today's positivist, utilitarian world to the natural rights world of the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century is, in the apt words of Larry Kramer, "rather like visiting a foreign
country." 25 This cultural and social divide impacts the way people today may interpret historical texts and the meaning of particular words
in those texts, such as the omnipresent legal term of art, "privilege."
In early American history, legal privileges comprised many fundamental rights, such as due process rights, property rights, and even patent
26
rights.
In three parts, this Article will advance its thesis that the social
contract doctrine and a labor theory of property defined early American patent rights as privileges. First, it will explain the birth of the
Jeffersonian story of patent law in Supreme Court decisions and how
many intellectual property scholars today have adopted Jefferson's
views of patents as a historical axiom. Second, it will explain how the
social contract doctrine influenced the development of American patent law, as revealed in the historical identification of patent rights as
privileges. In surveying primary sources from the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, including the Founders' writings, congressional
records, judicial decisions, and philosophical and legal treatises, this
Article reveals how "privilege" was a legal term of art in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries that referred to a civil right justified by natural rights philosophy. Finally, it will conclude by identifying some implications for patent law today of reasserting this intellectual context
back into the interpretation of the historical record.
This intellectual history has far-reaching consequences. First, as a
historical matter, it resolves many puzzles about patent doctrines created by the Jeffersonian story of patent law. If it were true that patents
were strictly-limited, specially-conferred monopoly privileges saved
24
Cf Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search ofJustification,
86 CAL. L. REv. 241, 259 (1998) (noting that the supporting theory of trade secrets doctrine in the nineteenth century "began to lose its grip, first with the rise of sociological
jurisprudence, and then with the advent of legal realism in the early twentieth century").
Bone specifically recognizes that " [a] new positivism and commitment to instrumental reasoning replaced the natural law formalism of the late nineteenth century. This change
undermined the logic of the common law property theory ...." Id. See generally Adam
Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIz. L. REv. 371 (2003) (examining the impact on property doctrines by the cultural shift at the turn of the twentieth
century from natural law and natural rights reasoning to utilitarian and positivist
reasoning).
25
Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO.WASH. L. REv.387, 390 (2003).
26
See infra Parts 11,III.A.
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from condemnation given only their social utility, then why did antebellum courts classify patents as property rights, 27 develop liberal in-

terpretative presumptions favoring their validity, 28 and create
additional rights beyond those authorized in the patent statutes, such
as a patentee's right to obtain a "reissued" patent in order to correct a
mistakenly defective patent?2 9 Furthermore, if patents were strictly
limited privileges, why did Congress expressly provide for patent term
extensions in the 1836 Patent Act?30 Such developments make sense
only if one first understands the intellectual context of the patent privilege in the early American republic.
Second, this intellectual history exposes the improper use of the
historical record in today's intellectual property debates. Lawyers and
intellectual property scholars have been using the Jeffersonian story of
patent law in claiming that historical authority undoubtedly supports
a more restrictive approach to intellectual property doctrines today.
In essence, they have been using this historical claim to do the descriptive heavy lifting in their normative work. When the intellectual
context of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is reasserted back
into the historical analysis, it reveals that the Jeffersonian story of pat31
ent law is at best a half-truth-at worst, it is an outright myth.
I
THE JEFFERSONIAN STORY OF PATENT LAW

The Jeffersonian story of patent law is a potent historical claim
because it contains a kernel of truth. There were some antebellum
politicians and jurists who viewed patents as "odious monopolies" that
were granted to inventors given only their social utility. 3 2 But the Jeffersonian story of patent law elevates this one viewpoint into unquestioned historical axiom, and the rest of the record is suppressed or
See infra Part III.B.
See infta Part III.C.1.
29
See infra Part III.C.2.
30
See infra Part III.C.3.
31
Cf Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing Copyright's Mythology, 6 GREEN BAG 2d 37, 46
(2002) (critiquing as a "myth" the attempt by the petitioners in Eldred v. Ashcroft to frame
the history of copyright law in modern terms).
32
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, government-created monopolies were
condemned as "odious" because they infringed rights in property and commerce. See, e.g.,
MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXIX (prohibiting monopolies because "monopolies are odious, contrary to the spirit of a free government, and the principles of commerce"); Allen v.
Hunter, I F. Cas. 476, 477 (C.C.D. Ohio 1855) (No. 225) (noting the truism that "monopolies are justly odious" because a monopolist "takes from the public that which belongs to it"
through "the exercise of the sovereign power"); I Op. Att'y Gen. 110 (1802) (stating that
"[t]he [patent] privilege is a monopoly in derogation of common right"); see also The Case
of Monopolies, 11 Co. Rep. 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1266 (KB. 1602) (condemning, in
Lord Coke's report of this famous case, a playing card monopoly granted by Queen Elizabeth under her royal prerogative as an "odious monopoly").
27
28
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ignored by compressing it into our modern utilitarian framework that
deprives it of the intellectual context that gave it meaning. Before
explaining this intellectual context and the role of American patent
law within it, it is first necessary to examine how the Supreme Court
gave birth to the Jeffersonian story of patent law, and how intellectual
property professors, legal historians, and policy activists have nurtured
this myth.
A.

The Supreme Court's Creation of the Jeffersonian Story of
Patent Law

In the mid-twentieth century, the Graham Court recognized Jefferson for an accomplishment that was eclipsed apparently by his
other Founding Era activities-it anointed him the founder of American patent law. The Court justified its sweeping discussion of Jefferson's views on patents because, it claimed, Jefferson was an important
figure in early American patent law: he was the "moving spirit" in implementing the 1790 Patent Act and "he was also the author of the
1793 Patent Act."3 3 To further establish Jefferson's bona fides on the
subject of patents, the Court pointed out that 'Jefferson was himself
'34
an inventor of great note.
The Graham Court quoted liberally from Jefferson's correspondence, including his now-famous 1813 letter to inventor Isaac McPherson. 35 At a minimum, this letter disabuses anyone of the idea that the
author of the Declaration of Independence believed there was a natural right to the machines or other discoveries produced by the labors
of an inventor. The Court's quotation of Jefferson's letter, although
lengthy, has proven so significant that itjustifies its reproduction here:
Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late in the
progress of society. It would be curious then, if an idea, the fugitive
fermentation of an individual brain, could, of natural right, be
claimed in exclusive and stable property. If nature has made any
one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is
the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual
may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the
moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every
one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar
character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other
possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives
instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his
taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. That ideas
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1966).
Id. See generally SILVIo A. BEDINI, THOMAS JEFFERSON: STATESMAN OF SCIENCE (1990)
(detailing Jefferson's extensive scientific and inventive activities, such as inventing a device
that duplicated all of his letters).
35
Graham, 383 U.S. at 7-11.
33

34
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should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the
moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by
nature, when she made them, like fire, expansible over all space,
without lessening their density in any point, and like the air in
which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of
confinement or exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in
nature, be a subject of property. Society may give an exclusive right
to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to men to
pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be
of the society, without
done, according to the will and convenience
36
claim or complaint from anybody.
Although this historical excursion was dictum-the Court hardly
needed to establish the historical policy underpinnings of American
patent law in a case addressing one of the novel statutory provisions in
the 1952 Patent Act 37-its lengthy and numerous quotations from Jefferson's writings established his views as the historical policy foundation for American patent law. Some Justices joining the Graham
decision already believed that the Founders viewed patents as special
grants of monopoly privileges,38 but Graham formally gave birth to
what has grown into the Jeffersonian story of patent law.3 9 If there was
any doubt about this, the Court reaffirmed its fealty to the Jeffersonian story of patent law over the next two decades by continually re4°
turning toJefferson as the expositor of early American patent policy.
36

Id. at 9 n.2 (citation omitted); see also Letter to Isaac McPherson, supra note 2, at

333-34.
37
Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792. The issue of first impression before the Graham
Court concerned the construction of § 103 of the 1952 Patent Act, which codified the
nineteenth-century judicially-created doctrine that inventions cannot be "obvious... to a
person having ordinary skill in the art." 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850) (affirming an invalidation of a patent because
"the improvement is the work of the skilful mechanic, not that of the inventor").
Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Co., 340 U.S. 147, 154
38
See, e.g.,
(1950) (Douglas,J., concurring) ("Every patent is the grant of a privilege of exacting tolls
from the public. The Framers plainly did not want those monopolies freely granted.").
-39 This was not the first time the Court relied on Jefferson's correspondence to create
constitutional doctrine. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association about establishing "a wall of separation between Church and State" as a historical foundation for Establishment Clause
jurisprudence); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 163-64 (1878) (same). It is a curious coincidence that legal scholars also accuse the Everson Court of creating a historical
myth in its use of Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association. See generally PHILIP
HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002).
40
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 147-48 (1989)
(discussing Thomas Jefferson's views on patents as the basis of patent law policy); Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980) (discussing Jefferson's role in drafting the
1793 Patent Act); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual PropertyIs Still Property, 13 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POCY 108, 117 (1990) (noting that in Bonito Boats "[n]oJustice questioned the
equation of patent to monopoly," and that the 'Justices attributed this view to Thomas
Jefferson").
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It is, of course, understandable why the Graham Court found Jefferson's letter to McPherson to be such a compelling historical resource. Notably, Jefferson's justification for patents is forward
looking. He forcefully advanced the utilitarian and economic justification of the patent system-the primary justification for patents today. 4 1 Furthermore, Jefferson's compelling rhetoric, such as
comparing ideas to an inexhaustible flame that spreads the light of
understanding throughout the world, is moving in a way that an ab42
stract economic lesson in public goods or free-riding behavior is not.

Finally, and most importantly, this is one of the few policy statements
on the Copyright and Patent Clause by a Founder, 43 and it is clearly
authored by the man who wrote the Declaration of Independence.
Jefferson's eloquent prose captures with great flourish what is other41
Although scholars today identify many operative policies in patent law, these policies are only different applications of the same utilitarian, incentive-creating theory. See,
e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW (2003) (analyzing dynamic efficiency in intellectual property regimes); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progressof Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56
U. CHI. L. REv. 1017, 1024-30 (1989) (incentive to invent and disclose); F. Scott Kieff,
Property Rights and Property Rules for CommercializingInventions, 85 MINN. L. REv. 697 (2001)
(incentive to commercialize); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Functionof the Patent System,
20J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977) (incentive to invent).
42
Unsurprisingly, scholars often quote or cite Jefferson's letter to McPherson in explaining that intellectual property is a public good. See, e.g., Anupam Chander, The New,
New Property, 81 TEX. L. REv. 715, 746 n.167 (2003);Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace:
The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management,"97 MICH. L. REv. 462, 471 n.25 (1998);
Paul Ganley, DigitalCopyright and the New Creative Dynamics, 12 INT'LJ.L. & INFO. TECH. 282,
288 n.36 (2004); James Gibson, Re-Reifying Data, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 163, 173 n.27
(2004); Kieff, supra note 41, at 727 n.130; Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumers and Creative
Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539, 547 n.42 (2003);
Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 771 (1999);
Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights MorallyJustified? The Philosophy of Property Rights
and Ideal Objects, 13 HARv.J.L. & PuB. POL'v 817, 846 n.116 (1990); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating
Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 77, 116
n.215 (1999); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the
Patent Bargain, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 81, 104 n.104; Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Is There a
Right to Have Something to Say? One View of the PublicDomain, 73 FoRDHlAm L. REv. 297, 371
n.308 (2004); Daphne Keller, A GaudierFuture That Almost Blinds the Eye, 52 DUKE L.J. 273,
295 n.94 (2002) (reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001)).
43
Aside from Madison's very brief comments on the Copyright and Patent Clause in
The Federalist Papers, see THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 271-72 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961),Jefferson's letter to McPherson represents the most extensive commentary
by a Founder, albeit not a Framer, on the nature of patent rights. See NAALTERSCHEID, supra
note 12, at 110 (explaining that, except for The Federalist No. 43, "no Framer ever offered
any explanation of the [the Copyright and Patent Clause] or of why it was included in the
draft Constitution"). A letter by Madison from the famous Madison-Jefferson correspondence during the Constitutional Convention was published posthumously, in which
Madison does discuss patents, but this was private correspondence that was unknown at the
time. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprinted in 1
THE REPUBLIC OF LErTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES

MADISON 1776-1790, at 562-66 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995); see also infra note 120 and

accompanying text (noting the lack of commentary at the Constitutional Convention).
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wise stated in dry, legalistic language in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. One cannot begrudge the Court for highlighting this
important and compelling policy declaration by a Founder, but this is
a far cry from the myopic historical focus adopted by the Court and
intellectual property scholars in the years that followed-creating the
Jeffersonian story of patent law.
B.

The Scholars' Embrace of the Jeffersonian Story of Patent
Law

Although Jefferson's letter to McPherson was known before
1966, 4 4 the Court's elevation of it to the status of constitutional and
historical policy foundation for American patent law greatly affected
how scholars and lawyers viewed the history of American patent rights.
Patent scholars largely concluded that the Copyright and Patent
Clause originally authorized Congress to grant only special legal privileges as an exception to broadly accepted limits on government monopolies. Almost all seem to agree that natural rights philosophy
played no substantive role in the creation or development of early
American patent law.
With few exceptions that are notable if only because they are so
rare, 4 5 academic scholarship has conferred on the Jeffersonian story
of patent law the status of historical axiom. Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
among many others, 46 believes that Jefferson's letter to McPherson is
See Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and the Jeffersonian Mythology, 29 J. MARSHALL L.
269, 303 n.157 (1995) (noting thatJefferson's letter to McPherson was publicly disseminated in 1814). Frank Prager, one of the few early historians of patent law, also reprinted a substantial portion ofJefferson's letter to McPherson in his 1944 article, A History
of Intellectual Propertyfrom 1545 to 1787, supra note 9, at 759.
45
See Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies:Of Piracy, Propertization,
and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 1026-34 (2006) (discussing Jefferson's contradictory views on the legitimacy of patents and copyrights); Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual
Property and ConstitutionalNorms, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 272, 340 n.287 (2004) (noting that the
historical sources are mixed concerning whether patents fit the eighteenth-century definition of "monopoly");Joan E. Schaffner, PatentPreemption Unlocked, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 1081,
1099-1103 (discussing how Lockean ideas influenced Founding Era views of patents); cf
Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 7, at 2375-90 (questioning reliance on Jefferson as a primary historical authority in copyright law but accepting the historical claim that copyrights
were viewed as "government-created monopolies").
See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES & JANE C. GINSBURG, FOUNDATIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
46
PROPERTY 21 (2004) (quoting Jefferson's letter to McPherson as a primary historical document because it has been "most influential" in its "refutation of the 'natural rights' theory
of intellectual property"); JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAw 131
(2003) (quoting Jefferson's characterization of the "exclusive patent" as an "embarrassment" in speaking of the policy justification for the nonobviousness requirement); Tom W.
Bell, IndelicateImbalancingin Copyright andPatent Law, in Corv FIGHTS 1, 5-6 (Adam Thierer
& Wayne Crews eds., 2002) (quoting Jefferson's letter to McPherson as evidence that "the
Founders . . . viewed copyrights and patents as exceptions to natural rights"); Linda J.
Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious
Reconceptualizationof the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 330 n.124 (2002) (citing
44
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proof that the "framers of the United States Constitution rejected the
notion that inventors have a natural property right in their inventions. ' 47 In the increasingly acrimonious debate over the "propertization" of intellectual property rights in digital media,48 Lessig and
others repeatedly cite Jefferson's letter to McPherson as historical authority that early Americans were "against the idea that patent protection was in some sense a natural right."49 In reproducing Jefferson's
Jefferson's letter to McPherson in discussing how patent "monopolies" have been historically limited); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 363,
366 (2001) (quoting Jefferson's letter to McPherson as evidence of traditional defense of
nonobviousness doctrine as a limit on patents as "monopoly rights"); Robert Patrick
Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The ProperScope of the Copyright and PatentPower, 37 HARV.
J. ON LECIS. 45, 47 (2000) (discussing Jefferson throughout the article in noting that "the
grant of copyright and patent power in the Constitution was intended to provide a positive
incentive for technological and literary progress while avoiding the abuse of monopoly
privileges"); Ochoa & Rose, supra note 12, at 925 (concluding from Jefferson's correspondence that "[i]t is clear that many of the Framers were concerned with restraining monopolies of all kinds"); Max Stul Oppenheimer, In Vento Scribere: The Intersection of Cyberspaceand
Patent Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 229, 236 (1999) (quoting Jefferson's letter to McPherson as
general "constitutional background" to patent law); see also supra note 42 (listing, among
other sources, patent law articles citing to or quoting from Jefferson's letter to
McPherson).
47
Eisenberg, supra note 41, at 1024 n.27.
48
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
49
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 95 (2001); see also id. at 58-59 (quoting
Jefferson's letter to McPherson as supporting the historical claim that patents and copyrights were only special, limited monopoly privileges); Lawrence Lessig, The Death of Cyberspace, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 337, 337-39 (2000) (quoting extensively from Jefferson's
letter to McPherson for the proposition that "[i]deas get to run free"). In Free Culture,
Lessig continues to ply this historical claim, noting that patent and copyright were merely
"exceptions to free use [of] ideas and expressions," LESSIG, supra note 7, at 84, which grew
out of England's "long and ugly experience with 'exclusive rights,' especially 'exclusive
rights' granted by the Crown," id. at 88. See also SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND
COPYWRONGS 23-24 (2001) (citing Jefferson's letter to McPherson as evidence that "the
founders . . . did not argue for copyrights or patents as 'property,"' and instead viewed
these legal entitlements as "a Madisonian compromise, a necessary evil, a limited, artificial
monopoly"); Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and
Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 60-61 (2001) (quoting Jefferson's letter to McPherson as proof
that the Constitution protects intellectual property privileges only on utilitarian grounds);
James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and HardwiredCensors, 66 U. CIN.
L. REV. 177, 182 (1997) (quoting Jefferson's letter to McPherson as evidence for the proposition that "information wants to be free" (citation omitted)); James Boyle, The Second
Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the PublicDomain, 66 LAW & CONrEMP. PROBs. 33,
53-54 (2003) (quoting extensively from Jefferson's letter to McPherson for the proposition
that intellectual property is a monopoly); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of
Copyright: Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHi. L. REV. 263, 263
(2002) (leading off the article with a quote from Jefferson's letter to McPherson); Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Grokking Grokster, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 1217, 1280 (quoting Jefferson's
analogy of ideas to fire as a basis for understanding the dissemination of information over
the Internet today); David L. Lange, Students, Music and the Net: A Comment on Peer-to-PeerFile
Sharing, 2003 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 21 (quoting extensively from Jefferson's letter to McPherson as evidence of utilitarian justification for copyright and patent privileges); Peter S.
Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 185 n.431
(2002) (citingJefferson's letter to McPherson as animating activists for civil liberties on the
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letter to McPherson in their patent law casebook, Donald Chisum,
Craig Nard, and others conclude that "Locke's natural rights theory
'5'
and its impact with respect to intellectual property is dubious.
Today's patent law historians endorse these generalized claims
about the lack of any influence by natural rights philosophy on the
early development of American patent law. Edward Walterscheid, the
principal patent law historian today, 5' states as simple historical fact:
"It is important to recognize that the patent custom known to the
Framers involved privileges rather than property rights as such. The
distinction between a patent privilege and a patent property right is an
important one, and one not always recognized in the early literature
on the patent law."' 52 Walterscheid cites as evidence that John Fitch,
one of the inventors of the steamboat, deleted the term "right" from a
draft petition for legislation protecting his inventive work and replaced it with "privilege" in the final version that he submitted to Congress in 1786 (under the Articles of Confederation). 53 Even prior to
the 1780s, Walterscheid maintains that the patent regimes in the various American colonies and states "involve[ed] exclusive grants of
54
privilege."
Admittedly, Walterscheid and others criticize the Court's excessive reliance on Jefferson, 55 but these are solely institutional or doctriInternet); Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrinefor Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107, 118 n.43 (2001) (citing Jefferson's letter to McPherson as evidence that early American copyright statutes were viewed as "a form of welfare grant");
Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroadsof Trademark Law, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 129 (2005) (citing Jefferson's letter to McPherson to support the
claim about copyright that "[t] he scope of an individual's rights in his or her work is meant
to be narrowly construed and should theoretically be limited only to protection that is
necessary to maximize public welfare"); Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57
STAN. L. REV. 485, 534 n.177 (2004) (quotingJefferson's letter to McPherson in support of
the proposition that copyright is merely a utility-maximizing monopoly grant); John
Tehranian, All Rights Reserved? Reassessing Copyright and PatentEnforcement in the Digital Age,
72 U. CIN. L. REV. 45, 45 (2003) (quoting Jefferson's letter to McPherson in the introduction of the article).
50
CHISUM ET AL., supra note 22, at 44.
51
See, e.g., Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the U.S. Patent Law: Antecedents (5, Part I1), 78J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'V 665 (1996); Edward C. Walterscheid,
The Nature of the IntellectualProperty Clause: A Study in HistoricalPerspective (Part 1), 83 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'V 763 (2001); Edward C. Walterscheid, Priority of Invention: How the
United States Came to Have a "Firstto Invent"Patent System, 23 AIPLA Q.J. 263 (1995); Edward
C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progressof Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of
the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2J. INrTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1994).
52
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 12, at 14 (emphasis added).
53
Id. at 225; see infta note 117 and accompanying text (discussing this alleged proof of
the Jeffersonian story of patent law).
54
Walterscheid, supra note 44, at 272 (emphasis added).
55
See, e.g., id. at 270 (identifying the Court's use ofJefferson in its patent lawjurisprudence as creating a "mythology"); see also KennethJ. Burchfiel, Revising the "Original"Patent
Clause: Pseudohistoriy in Constitutional Construction, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155, 155 (1989)
(calling the Court's citation ofJefferson "pseudohistory"); Edward C. Walterscheid, The Use
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nal critiques5 6 in which they repeatedly reaffirm the Jeffersonian story
of patent law: patents were special monopoly privileges that had the
same "limitations" as other special monopoly privileges granted by the
government. 5 7 Moreover, when scholars look beyond Jefferson and
the Founding Era, they rely on select sources from the nineteenth
century that support the Jeffersonian story of patent law, such as patent law decisions by Chief Justice Roger Taney, the famously anti-monopolist Jacksonian Democrat, 58 and Justice John McLean's 1832
decision in Wheaton v. Peters.59 Contrary evidence suggesting that natural rights philosophy influenced early patent law doctrine is dismissed as either empty judicial "rhetoric"60 or merely rent-seeking
and Abuse of History: The Supreme Court's Interpretation of Thomas Jefferson's Influence on the
Patent Law, 39 IDEA 195, 195 (1999) (claiming that the Court's reliance on Jefferson is an
.abuse of history").
56 See, e.g., Burchfiel, supra note 55, at 209 (accusing the Court of failing to acknowledge "Jefferson's contemporaries" who had similar views as Jefferson about "the patent
power and its limitations"); Walterscheid, supra note 44, at 289 (noting that "the Supreme
Court has on at least three occasions incorrectly stated thatJefferson drafted the Patent Act
of 1793").
57
Burchfiel, supra note 55, at 209; see also WALTERSCHEID, supra note 12, at 297 ("The
Framers clearly viewed patents and copyrights as monopolies and assumed that they would
be treated as such.").
58
Taney is best known for his anti-monopoly decision in Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837), in which the Court strictly construed a monopoly
franchise granted by Massachusetts. The Charles River Bridge decision is widely regarded as
"reflect[ing] the prevailing anti-monopoly sentiment that was one of the hallmarks of the
Jacksonian period." Deborah A. Ballam, The Evolution of the Government-Business Relationship
in the United States: Colonial Times to Present, 31 AM. Bus. L.J. 553, 592 (1994); see also THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN LAW 783 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2002) (discussing
Taney's "fervent" commitment to Jacksonian ideals).
For a representative sample of citations to Taney's claim in Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55
U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852), that patents represent only a "right to exclude" others
from this special "franchise" grant, see CHISUM ET AL., supra note 22, at 4; 1 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW BASICS § 1:11 (2d ed. 2006); Kieff, supra note 41, at 736
n. 163; Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing PatentDisclosurefor Faithful Claim Construction, 9 LEwIS
& CLARK L. REV. 177, 178 n.5 (2005); Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practicesand
the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 37, 37 (2004); Edward C. Walterscheid, Divergent
Evolution of the Patent Power and the Copyright Power, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 307, 330
(2005).
59
33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); see infra Part II.B.2.
60
See, e.g., Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600-1836: How Patents Became
Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 177, 210 n.185 (2004) (claiming that
"judicial rhetoric was influenced by concepts taken from Lockean natural rights thought"
in eighteenth-century patent cases, but that any claims of substantive influence by natural
rights philosophy "is simply false"); cf Glynn S. Lunney,Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY
L.J. 367, 439-40 (1999) (claiming in modem trademark law that "[p]erhaps recognizing ... that natural rights' day, if it ever was, has passed, few courts will rest their conclusions on natural rights rhetoric or the simple-minded syllogism of but-for causation");
Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures ofProperty: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and
Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REv. 129, 159 (1998) (critiquing the "rhetoric of romantic genius"
that underlies the "practice of intellectual property law . . . to focus on the distinctive,
completed work claimed by the specified individual author or inventor").
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claims by self-interested inventors. 6' Walterscheid definitively declares that modern patent rights evolved historically "for reasons hav'62
ing very little to do with any perceived 'natural law' right.
The Jeffersonian story of patent law reigns supreme in the courts,
among intellectual property professors, and in historical scholarship.
When judges, scholars, and activists read historical documents, they
see terms like "privilege" and thus find vindication that the Jeffersonian story of patent law is historically accurate. Before one can show
the influence that natural rights philosophy exerted on early American patent doctrines, however, the intellectual context of the historical sources must first be established, which brings into focus the
historical meaning of terms like "privilege." Thus, Part II will explicate this background political and constitutional context, showing
how "privileges" referred to fundamental civil rights considered on
par with natural rights. Once this context has been established, widely
misinterpreted sources, such as Madison's remarks about patents in
The FederalistNo. 43 and the references to patents in Wheaton, can be
clarified. Finally, Part III will examine the largely undiscovered history of American patent law in the early nineteenth century, revealing
the substantive impact of the social contract doctrine and the labor
theory of property of natural rights philosophy.
II
RECONSTRUCTING THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE

PATENT PRIVILEGE

The provenance of the American patent system, as the American

property system generally, is found in the English feudal system. The
fountainhead of Anglo-American patent law was the English Crown's
granting manufacturing monopoly privileges to industrialists to promote the economic development of the realm. 63 But an American
patent in the late eighteenth century was radically different from the
royal monopoly privilege dispensed by Queen Elizabeth or KingJames
in the early seventeenth century. 64 Patents no longer created, and
sheltered from competition, manufacturing monopolies-they se61
See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 12, at 14-15 (claiming that, in contrast to the Framers' view of patents as special grants of "privilege," some "inventors, who had the most
practical interest in the matter,.., in the eighteenth century began to argue that they had
a natural, inherent property right in their inventions").
62

Id. at 15.

See Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History,
1550-1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1259-76 (2001).
64 See id.; see also Rich, supra note 23, at 244 (concluding from a survey of early English
cases that "[t]he meaning of words like 'patents' often changes with time and place").
63
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cured the exclusive control of an inventor over his novel and useful
65
scientific or mechanical invention.
Despite this change in the subject matter of patent grants-from
manufacturing monopolies secured by royal grant to novel and useful
inventions secured by statute-courts and other institutional actors
continued to refer to patents as "privileges." 6 6 This continuing use of
"privilege" in American patent law suggests that, despite this change
between 1600 and 1800 in the nature of the patent, Americans remained wedded to viewing patents as specially conferred, governmentgranted privileges. This conclusion seems almost undeniable when
Justice Joseph Story-the jurist responsible for creating many American patent doctrines 67-repeatedly referred to patents as "privileges"
68
in his own patent law decisions.
Although courts and scholars draw this conclusion today, this is
an anachronistic reading of the historical record. In the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, "privilege" referred to several distinct types
of legal rights secured to individuals in civil society. One must therefore know the context in which this term is used in any particular legal
text before one can draw any conclusions as to its meaning. This context is not always self-evident, as "privilege" was a basic term of political and legal discourse in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
This meant that Founders, congressmen, and courts rightly assumed
that their audiences would understand the meaning of "privilege" in
its relevant textual context, just as judges and lawyers need not define
basic legal terms, such as "tide" or "complaint," when they compose
their formal legal texts today.
65
SeeBedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1,217) (Story, Circuit
Justice) ("No person is entitled to a patent under the act of congress unless he has invented some new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, not
known or used before.").
66
See, e.g., Burr v. Duryee, 4 F. Cas. 806, 810 (C.C.D.N.J. 1862) (No. 2,190) (referring
to patents as the "valuable and just privilege given to inventors"); Day v. Union IndiaRubber Co., 7 F. Cas. 271, 275 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1856) (No. 3,691) (characterizing patents as
"special privileges granted to inventors"); Am. Pin Co. v. Oakville Co., 1 F. Cas. 712, 712
(C.C.D. Conn. 1854) (No. 313) (referring to "the privileges" granted by a patent); see also 8
REc. DEB. 996 (1832) (Sen. Dickerson) (opposing a bill granting U.S. patents to three
British subjects as "[h]e was not willing to extend these privileges to foreigners").
See Frank D. Prager, The Influence of Mr.Justice Story on American Patent Law, 5 Am. J.
67

HisT. 254, 254 (1961) (noting that it is "often said that Story was one of the architects of American patent law").
68
See, e.g., Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829) (Story,J.) (referring to a
patent as "the privilege of an exclusive right"); Pierson v. Eagle Screw Co., 19 F. Cas. 672,
674 (C.C.D.R.I. 1844) (No. 11,156) (Story, CircuitJustice) (instructing jury that "the defendants used the improvement under a license or privilege originally granted to them by
the inventor"); Washburn v. Gould, 29 F. Cas. 312, 316 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No. 17,214)
(Story, Circuit Justice) (construing renewal provision in patent statute as "intended as a
personal privilege of the patentee alone").
LEGAL
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Because the intellectual context of the eighteenth
teenth centuries has been lost to us today,6 9 it is necessary
lish this context in order to understand the meaning of
"privilege." In other words, one must first understand the

and nineto reestabthe patent
social contract doctrine at the heart of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century natural rights philosophy. This is not a game of linguistics or pettifoggery,
nor is it a problem faced only by patent lawyers; this is an essential
requirement in studying and using historical sources in the law generally. It is particularly pressing if one is researching legal topics that
are intimately associated with social and political philosophy, such as
constitutional clauses and their resulting application by Congress and

federal courts. 70 Thus, this Part will set forth the various senses in
which "privilege" was used in political and legal texts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and how some of these meanings
were derived from natural rights philosophy, specifically its social contract doctrine. Ultimately, this illuminates the meaning of the omnipresent references to patents as privileges in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries.
A.

Privilege

The appeal of the Jeffersonian story of patent law is somewhat
understandable because in Standard English today, "privilege" is an
antonym of "right."'7' In ordinary, day-to-day usage, a privilege is a
specially conferred grant in which its recipient cannot claim any
moral or legal entitlement to the subject matter of the grant. Many
popular aphorisms reflect this sense, particularly those used by parents admonishing their children, such as "a driver's license is a privi'72
lege, not a right" or "dessert after dinner is a privilege, not a right.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
See TRIBE, supra note 7, at 894 ("Natural law philosophy [was] current at the time
the Constitution was written .... "). Some scholars have recently sought to reassert this
broader intellectual context into the study of American legal history. See, e.g., Randy E.
Barnett, Are Enumerated ConstitutionalRights the Only Rights We Have? The Case of Associational Freedom, 10 HARV.J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 101, 102-06 (1987); Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 1549 (2003); Philip A. Hamburger,
Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907 (1993); Carl F.
Stychin, The Commentaries of ChancellorJames Kent and the Development of an American Common
69
70

Law, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 440 (1993).
71
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1805 (1981) (defining privilege

as "a peculiar or personal advantage or right esp. when enjoyed in derogation of common
right," or to "deliver by special grace or immunity"); 3 WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DIc-

TIONARY 1969 (2d ed. 1950) (defining privilege as a "right or immunity granted as a peculiar benefit, advantage, or favor").
72
Cf Lee v. State, 358 P.2d 765, 769 (Kan. 1961) ("It is an elementary rule of law that
the right to operate a motor vehicle.., is not a natural or unrestrained right, but a privilege
which is subject to reasonable regulation under the police power of the state .... ").
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Courts and legal scholars also employ this standard privilege versus
73
right distinction.
The use of language in the law, though, admits of much finer and
more specialized distinctions. Legal professionals have been splicing
Standard English words into legal terms of art for hundreds of years, if
not longer.7 4 It is not surprising then that "privilege" is a legal term of
art whose meaning diverges from the layperson's understanding of a
special benefit without a rightful claim.
This is neither a novel nor remarkable insight. The use of "privilege" as a legal term of art is omnipresent in the eighteenth century,
as evidenced by early American colonial and state constitutions. The
title of the constitution drafted by William Penn in founding Pennsylvania in 1701 reads: Charter of Privileges for Pennsylvania. '7 5 State
constitutions adopted during the American Revolution often guaranteed to the newly minted state citizens that they would retain "the privileges, immunities and estates" previously secured to them under their
colonial charters, 76 including the "inherent privilege of every freeman, the liberty to plead his own cause [in court] 77 or the privilege
to confront witnesses in criminal cases. 78 It is such fundamental civil
73 See, e.g., Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59, 65 (1971) (acknowledging the now "discredited maxim that paupers' appeals are privileges, not rights"); Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347
U.S. 442, 451 (1954) ("The practice of medicine . . . is a privilege granted by the State
under its substantially plenary power to fix the terms of admission."); Am. Commc'ns Ass'n
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 390 (1950) (explaining that the legislation under review would not
be evaluated as "if it merely withdraws a privilege gratuitously granted by the Government"); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926) (approving zoning
ordinances as a proper function of a state's police power because these regulations would,
among other things, prevent apartment buildings from "depriving children of the privilege
of quiet and open spaces for play"); Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 62 Cal. 69, 107
(1882) (noting that franchises granted by the state of California "do not pertain to the
citizens of the State by common right" and are simply "special privileges conferred by Government upon individuals"); see also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733,
740 (1964) ("The early law is marked by courts' attempts to distinguish which forms of
[governmental] largess were 'rights' and which were 'privileges.' Legal protection of the
former was by far the greater.").
74
In McCulloch v. Maryland, for instance, ChiefJustice Marshall discovered subtle distinctions in the legal definition of "necessary," as used in the Necessary and Proper Clause.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414 (1819) ("The word 'necessary' . . . has not a fixed character,
peculiar to itself. It admits of all degrees of comparison; .... A thing may be necessary,
very necessary, absolutely or indispensably necessary."). This practice goes back to antiquity, where Aristotle counseled "if a law is ambiguous, we shall turn it about and consider
which construction best fits the interests of justice or utility, and then follow that way of
looking at it." Aristotle, Rhetorica, in THE BASic WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1318, 1374 (Richard
McKeon ed., W. Rhys Roberts trans., 1941).
75

CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES GRANTED BY WILLIAM PENN, ESQ. TO THE INHABITANTS OF

PENNSYLVANIA AND TERRITORIES OF
76
PA. CONST. of 1776, § 45.

1701.

77

GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LVIII (emphasis omitted).

78

CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES GRANTED BY WILLIAM

PENN, ESQ. TO THE INHABITANTS OF

PENNSYLVANIA AND TERRITORIES OF 1701, art. V (providing that "all Criminals shall have the

same Privileges of Witnesses and Council as their Prosecutors").
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rights, among others, that the 1787 federal Constitution secured
equally for all United States citizens in its own Privileges & Immunities
Clause.7 9 Revolutionary Americans, influenced by Lockean ideals
concerning the social contract and natural rights, certainly did not
think that the rights of confrontation and self-representation in court
were merely special benefits doled out by their governments!
What is the connection between natural rights philosophy and
this specialized meaning of privilege? Most legal professionals today
are aware of the broad outlines of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century natural rights theory and its attendant social contract doctrine
that dominated early American politics, especiallyJohn Locke's political theory.80 They typically view the Lockean social contract as a binary, one-to-one exchange: each person relinquished his "Executive
Power" to enforce his natural rights and, in exchange, civil society secured and enforced these natural rights through its public institutions
and laws. 8' But Locke and his fellow natural rights philosophers in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had a more sophisticated
and substantive conception of the social contract and the impact it
had on citizens' rights.
Contrary to this oversimplified, modern picture of the social contract, Locke and his contemporaries recognized that entering into
civil society meant that one would "enjoy many Conveniences, from
the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same Community."8 2 Accordingly, a person had an expanded range of powers and
responsibilities vis-A-vis other people and the state-specifically with
respect to the legislative, executive, and judicial institutions that were
absent in the state of nature.8 3 In other words, in creating civil society, individuals not only secured the protection of their natural rights
but gained a litany of other rights that defined their freedoms relative
to their new fellow citizens and public institutions.
Working under the social contract doctrine in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, scholars, jurists, and politicians came to refer to
79 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
80 Although John Locke is arguably the most well-known natural lights philosopher
who influenced the Founders, early American politicians and jurists were extremely well
versed in all of the natural rights philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See infra notes 128, 131 and accompanying text.
81

JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 128, at 352 (Peter Laslett ed., Cam-

bridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690)

[hereinafter LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE].

In the famous

words of the Declaration of Independence, "We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all
men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness," and "to secure
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
82
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 81, § 130, at 353.

83

See id. § 124-26, at 350-51.
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the rights that arose as a consequence of the social contract as "privileges." William Blackstone's Commentaries provided Americans with
what became the canonical distinction between natural rights and civil
rights. 8

4

Blackstone explained that the original natural rights, such as

liberty, were secured in civil society as "private immunities. '8 5 But these
were not the only rights secured in civil society. Blackstone further
recognized that "society hath engaged to provide" additional rights
secured by express law, which he called "civil privileges."'8 6 Thus arose
the well-known locution in the federal and state constitutions, "privileges and immunities," which referred to civil and natural rights,
87
respectively.
In this way, the social contract doctrine of natural rights philosophy explained the complex relationship between the privileges and
immunities-civil and natural rights-secured to individuals in civil
society. For instance, in accord with his natural rights philosophy,
Blackstone recognized that property is an "absolute right."8 8 However, civil society created additional privileges concerning property
and its uses that did not exist in the state of nature, such as title deed
requirements and formal contractual requirements for conveying
property.89 These were the "civil advantages," Blackstone explained to
his American readers, that citizens received "in exchange for which
every individual has resigned a part of his natural liberty." 90 This was
not Blackstone's original insight, as Locke acknowledged in the Second
Treatise that "in Governments the Laws regulate the right of property,
and the possession of land is determined by positive constitutions." 9 1
These constitutions and civil laws secured fundamental property

84

See DANIELJ. BooRSTIN, Preface to the Beacon Press Edition, in THIE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE

OF THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (Peter Smith ed., Beacon Press

1958) (1941) ("In the history of American institutions, no other book-except the Biblehas played so great a role as Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England."); Duncan
Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 209 (1979) (critiquing the Commentaries because it is "the single most important source on English legal
thinking in the 18th century, and it has had as much (or more) influence on American
legal thought as it has had on British").
85
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES *125 (emphasis added).
86
Id. (emphasis added).
87
See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
88
BLACKSTONE, supra note 85, at *134.
89 See id. (recognizing "the modifications under which we at present find [property],
the method of conserving it in the present owner, and of translating it from man to man,
are entirely derived from society").
90

Id.

LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 81, § 50, at 302; see also id. § 45, at 299 (recognizing explicitly the legitimacy of title deed and other express legal requirements that "regulated" land ownership under the "Compact" or "positive agreement' creating "distinct
Territories" and "Laws within themselves").
91
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rights essential to the functioning of a just society-they secured
92
privileges.
In the Founding Era, Blackstone's "privilege" nomenclature was
as ubiquitous as the social contract doctrine that gave rise to it. 93 In
1783, when George Washington welcomed Irish immigrants to New
York City, he noted that the "bosom of America is open to .

.

. the

oppressed and persecuted of all Nations And Religions; whom we
shall welcome to a participation of all our rights and privileges." 94 At

the 1787 Constitutional Convention, James Madison argued forcefully
that the new Constitution must guarantee that citizens of different
states would share an "equality of privileges. '95 In The FederalistNo. 7,
Hamilton echoed this concern about securing "equal privileges" to all
citizens, noting specifically that the equal protection of these rights
played a central role in promoting "habits of intercourse"-commerce-between citizens of the different states.

96

Perhaps one of the most significant examples of a Founder distinguishing between civil and natural rights is found in Madison's remarks introducing in Congress the bills that would eventually become
92 Another example of a "privilege" is the just compensation requirement in the exercise of the eminent domain power. See Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 166 (N.Y.
Ch. 1816) (Kent, Chancellor) (justifying ajust compensation requirement as inherent in
the right of due process and "a deep and universal sense of its justice"). Although Gardner
does not use the legal terms "privilege" or "civil right," its reasoning clearly reflects the
social contract framework of natural rights philosophy.
93
For instance, Cato's Letters, the essays responsible for disseminating Locke's ideas
throughout Anglo-American society in the eighteenth century, embraced an identical usage of "privilege." Letter No. 62 states:
But where property is precarious, labour will languish. The privileges of
thinking, saying, and doing what we please, and of growing as rich as we can,
without any other restriction, than that by all this we hurt not the publick,
nor one another, are the glorious privileges of liberty; and its effects, to live in
freedom, plenty, and safety.
These are privileges that increase mankind, and the happiness of
mankind.
1 JOHN TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, CATO'S LETTERS 426, 432 (Ronald Hamowy ed.,
1995) (Letter No. 62, Saturday, Jan. 20, 1721) (emphases added). The letter later remarks,
"This shews that all civil happiness and prosperity is inseparable from liberty; and that
tyranny cannot make men, or societies of men, happy, without departing from its nature,
and giving them privileges inconsistent with tyranny." Id. at 433.
94
Letter from George Washington to The Members of the Volunteer Association and
Other Inhabitants of the Kingdom of Ireland Who Have Lately Arrived in the City of New
York (Dec. 2, 1783), in 27 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, 1783-1784, at 253, 254
(John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1938).
95
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 317 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) (criticizing the New Jersey proposal for failing to uniformly protect citizens'
privileges).
96 THE FEDERALIST No. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 43, at 63; see also Ward v.
Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870) (holding that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause "plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the right of a citizen of one State to
pass into any other State of the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce,
trade, or business").
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the Bill of Rights. 9 7 Madison noted that the bills expressly secured

both natural rights and civil rights. The civil rights were "specif[ied]
positive rights, which may seem to result from the nature of the compact. ' 98 Such rights, though, were as essential as "liberty" and the
other pre-existing natural "rights which are exercised by the people in
forming and establishing a plan of Government."99 One such civil
fight was trial by jury, ultimately secured in what would become the
Seventh Amendment, and which Madison eloquently defended in
terms of natural rights philosophy: "Trial by jury cannot be considered as a natural right, but a right resulting from a social compact,
which regulates the action of the community, but is as essential to
secure the liberty of the people as any one of the pre-existent rights of
nature." 10 0 Such words should lay to rest the mistaken belief that in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, statutory rights, such as patents, either conflicted with natural rights or lacked any justification in
natural rights philosophy.10 1
Consistent with these remarks by Blackstone and the Founders,
early American courts used "privilege" to refer to those rights that
necessarily flowed out of the social compact and thus were secured
under express law in civil society. In 1809, ChiefJustice John Marshall
referenced the "privilege to contracts," 10 2 a common identification of
contract rights in Supreme Court decisions throughout the nineteenth century. 10 In 1823, Justice Bushrod Washington identified as
"privileges deemed to be fundamental" such rights as the "elective
franchise," "the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus," and the "right of
a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state,
for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise,"

97

See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 454 Uoseph Gales ed., 1789).

98

Id.

99

Id.

100
Id.
101
See, e.g., Bone, supra note 24, at 256 (noting that, in the nineteenth century,
"[s]tatutes... were just expressions of historically and culturally contingent social policy,"
and thus "the Copyright and Patent Acts had no special claim to authority" under natural
rights philosophy).
102 Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289, 298 (1809).
103
See, e.g., Stark v. Starr, 94 U.S. 477, 479 (1876) (recognizing that a land conveyance
contract was intended to "divide the proceeds of any sales of lots or other property or
privileges on the land claimed"); Piqua Branch of State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16
How.) 369, 381 (1853) (noting that the "privileges granted in private corporations are not
a legislative command, but a legislative contract, not liable to be changed"); Peyroux v.
Howard, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 324, 338 (1833) (acknowledging an argument by counsel that
under Louisiana law "an express contract for [repairing a ship for] a specific sum is not a
waiver of the privilege" to a lien on the ship); St. Jago de Cuba, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 409, 417
(1824) (noting that "rights derived under maritime contracts" are "called liens or
privileges").
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among many other rights. 10 4 ChiefJustice Marshall andJustice Washington's references to these fundamental rights as "privileges" flowed
directly from their acceptance of the basic tenets of the ubiquitous
social contract doctrine of their day. The term "privilege" was merely
the technically precise way of identifying those rights conferred, defined, and secured in civil society, and one can find many examples in
antebellum case law reflecting this usage. 10 5 Chief Justice Marshall's
orJustice Washington's contemporaries would not have read their decisions to suggest that such constitutional and statutory entitlements
constituted only gratuitous benefits granted to citizens without any
claim of right or justice.
It is, of course, too easy to go to the opposite extreme, committing the converse error as the Jeffersonian story of patent law, in
which one interprets every historical use of "privilege" as referring to a
fundamental civil right. There were cases,' 0 6 and even antiquarian legal dictionaries, 10 7 in which the modern, standard meaning of privilege is used. Also, renowned natural law philosophers known to the
Founders and early American judges and lawyers, such as Cicero and
Aquinas, defined a privilege as an express grant of a legal right or
104
Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (Washington,
Circuit Justice). In 1866, a congressman declared with poetic flourish that the Privileges
and Immunities Clause in Article IV, Section 2, was "the palladium of equal fundamental
civil fights for all citizens." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1836 (1866) (statement of
Rep. Lawrence).
105
See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 574 (1839) (recognizing
that "it is the privilege of every complainant to bring suit in any English or American Court
upon all lawful contracts"); Calder v. Bull 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398 (1798) (Iredell, J.,
concurring) (referring to Connecticut's "strange... power to grant, with respect to suits
depending or adjudged, new rights of trial, new privileges of proceeding, not previously
recognized and regulated by positive institutions"); Evans v. Kremer, 8 F. Cas. 874, 875
(C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 4,565) (Washington, CircuitJustice) (referring to the "privilege of
pleading the general issue" in court).
106
See, e.g., Adams v. Burks, 1 F. Cas. 100, 101 (C.C.D. Mass. 1871) (No. 50) (referring
to the "peculiar privileges secured by the patent"); Day v. Union India-Rubber Co., 7 F.
Cas. 271, 275 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1856) (No. 3,691) (noting that patents grant "special and exclusive privileges" to inventors in order to benefit the public); Ripley v. Knight, 123 Mass.
515, 519 (1878) (recognizing "the natural meaning of the word 'privilege,' which may be
defined as a right peculiar to an individual or body").
See, e.g., THOMAS BLOUNT, A LAw-DIcTIONARY (2d ed. 1691) ("A PersonalPriviledge is
107
that which is granted or allowed to any person, either against or besides the course of the
Common-Law ....
); 2 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY 298 (1839) (defining privilege,
in part, as "a particular law ... which grants certain special prerogatives to some persons,
contrary to common right"); GILESJACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY U. Morgan ed., 10th ed.
1782) (defining privilege, in part, as "whereby a private man, or a particular corporation is
exempted from the rigor of the Common law") 2 STEWART RAPALJE & ROBERT L. LAWRENCE,
A DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN AND ENGLISH LAW 1009 (1883) ("A privilege is an exceptional
or extraordinary right, immunity or exemption."); 3 THOMAS E. TOMLINS, THE LAw-DICTIONARY 219 (1836) (defining privilege, in part, "whereby a private man, or a particular
corporation is exempted from the rigour of the Common Law"). See also THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (quoting from a 1799 source that a privilege "in Roman
jurisprudence, means the exemption of one individual from the operation of a law").
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benefit to a particular individual. 08 The conventional meaning
ascribed to privilege today-a special grant contrary to or without
right-is rooted in well-established historical practices. 109
This explication of the multiple senses of "privilege" in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries means that references to patent privileges in the historical record must be read in context. Readers today
should avoid any accidental anachronisms in construing an antiquarian legal text. For the same reason that it would be wrong to declare
in sweeping language that all uses of privilege in historical texts referred to fundamental civil rights expressly secured in civil society, it is
equally wrong to declare, as does Walterscheid, that the "Framers
clearly viewed patents and copyrights as monopolies and assumed that
they would be treated as such," 1 0 because the Framers allegedly embraced a "distinction between a patent privilege and a patent property
right."I II
Walterscheid's logic-the logic of the Jeffersonian story of patent
law-requires one to conclude that Blackstone, Washington, Madison,
Hamilton, and Chief Justice Marshall viewed rights of property conveyance and contract as specially conferred grants from the government lacking any basis in moral or legal right, 1 2 and that Justice
Washington thought the same of the right to vote." 3 Perhaps more
surprisingly, one would have to conclude that William Penn and other
American colonists similarly viewed constitutional rights, such as the
rights of confrontation and self-representation in court, as specially
conferred grants by the government, because they referred to such
rights as "privileges" in their state constitutions.1 4 These observations
establish a basic historiographical requirement: the Copyright and
Patent Clause, the patent statutes it empowers Congress to enact, and
the resulting federal case law should be construed in the same historical context as other constitutional and legal doctrines of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is time to come to terms with the
patent privilege in its appropriate intellectual context.
108
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae 1-I1, Q. 96, Art. 1, inON LAW, MORALITY,
AND POLITICS 64, 66 (William P. Baumgarth & Richard J. Regan, S.J. eds., Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., 1988) (explaining that some laws "are called 'privileges,' i.e., 'private laws,' as it were, because they regard private persons, although their
power extends to many matters"); CICERO, De Domo Sua, in THE SPEECHES 132, 132-311

(N.H. Watts trans., 1923) (stating that a legal "measure is a 'privilege'" if it addresses only
private individuals").
109
See Mossoff, supra note 63, at 1287 (discussing cases litigated before the Privy Council in the late seventeenth century in which patents were identified as royally conferred
privileges).
110
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 12, at 297.
1I
Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
112
See supra notes 84-102 and accompanying text.
113 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
114 See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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B.

The Patent Privilege in The FederalistNo. 43 and Wheaton

Once one has established the intellectual context set by natural
rights philosophy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this creates a more stringent standard of review in using historical materials
than has been employed previously in modern patent law decisions
and policy debates. As "privilege" had multiple senses, and one was
consistent with a natural rights justification for legal rights, patent law
history requires more than merely referencing Jefferson's remarks, 115
identifying who drafted which statutes, 1 6 or highlighting uses of "privilege" in the historical record' 1 7-it requires setting forth the intellectual context in which such events occurred. Rediscovering the
intellectual context set for patent law by natural rights philosophy in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries further requires reviewing
sources previously disregarded as empty rhetoric, such as Madison's
remarks in The FederalistNo. 43, or sources widely employed in support
of the Jeffersonian story of patent law, such as the Supreme Court's
decision in Wheaton v. Peters in 1834.
1.

Natural Rights, Social ContractDoctrine, and The Federalist
No. 43

One of the pressing problems with assessing the historical record
in patent law, especially for anyone who uses this record today, is the
paucity of Founding Era references to the Copyright and Patent
Clause specifically and patent law generally. 1 8 This is not a modern
insight, as one late nineteenth-century court faced with interpreting
115
116

See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra note 53 and accompanying text.
117
For example, Walterscheid cites Fitch's 1786 petition to Congress for a patent in
which Fitch replaced "right" with "privilege." See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
Without knowing more, we cannot say whether Fitch intended "privilege" in his petition to
function as a synonym for "right" (more specifically, an express civil right) or to refer to a
"specially-conferred benefit." Walterscheid provides additional details concerning Fitch's
petition in an earlier article, but it provides no information to answer this vital question.
See Edward C. Walterscheid, Chartinga Novel Course: The Creationof the Patent Act of 1790, 25
AIPLA Q.J. 445, 460-66 (1997).
In another of his monographs, though, Walterscheid quotes from another petition by
Fitch in which Fitch used "privilege" as a proper legal term of art. In this later petition,
submitted to the First Congress during its deliberations on the bill that became the Patent
Act of 1790, Fitch expressed concern about the absence of an explicit guarantee of a right
to jury trial for patent infringement lawsuits. He noted that the right of'Juries to decide"
the "matters of Fact respecting Property" is a "valuable privilege." See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION,

1798-1836, at 129 (1998)

[hereinafter To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL

ARTS] (quoting petition to the Senate, Mar. 13, 1790) (emphasis added). This suggests
that Fitch indeed understood the then-dominant and technically precise meaning of "privilege": a civil rightjustified by natural rights philosophy. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing Madison's natural-rights justification for the right to a jury trial).
118 See supra note 43 (discussing this lack of Founding Era sources on patents).
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the Copyright and Patent Clause confessed that "[w]hat immediate
reasons operated upon the framers of the Constitution seem to be
unknown."' " 9 This was one of the few constitutional provisions that
passed without any debate at the Constitutional Convention, and thus
nothing was said there indicating the truth of either the Jeffersonian
story of patent law or the social contract doctrine justification of natu120
ral rights philosophy.
Some scholars highlight statements by various Americans in the
Founding Era condemning commercial monopolies, but it is unclear
whether government-granted commercial monopolies, such as England's grants of exclusive trade routes to the East-India Company,
were viewed in the same light as patents for inventions.2 1 Although
119
McKeever v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 396, 420 (1878).
120 The constituent elements of what became the Copyright and Patent Clause were
proposed as various separately listed congressional powers on August 18, 1787, at which
time they were referred to the Committee on Detail without any discussion. See 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 321-22, 324-35 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911). The Committee presented the final version of the Copyright and Patent Clause to
the Convention on September 5, 1787 and Madison's notes reflect that the "clause was
agreed to nem. con" (without debate). Id. at 509-10. But see Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of
the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress's Intellectual
Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1781-1818 (2006) (analyzing the Constitutional Convention record and concluding that the Clause's original meaning can be determined based
on its textual structure and the proposals that led to it).
121
It is precisely this distinction between patents and copyrights, on the one hand, and
commercial monopolies, on the other, that Ochoa and Rose conflate in their citations to
the ratification debates. See Ochoa & Rose, supra note 12, at 922-28. For instance, they
quote George Mason declaring his opposition to the new Constitution because "[u]nder
their own construction of the general clause at the end of the enumerated powers, the
Congress may grant monopolies in trade and commerce." Id. at 927 (citation omitted).
They also identify another Anti-Federalist from New York who argued that "Monopolies in
trade [will be] granted to the favorites of government, by which the spirit of adventure will
be destroyed, and the citizens subjected to the extortion of those companies who will have
an exclusive right." Id. (citation omitted). Ochoa and Rose explicitly invoke these statements in support ofJefferson's critical views about patents and copyrights. Id. at 926 (stating that "Jefferson's concerns were widely shared by others at the time").
It is clear that Mason was not speaking of the Copyright and Patent Clause (in the
above quotation) because he references "the general clause at the end of the enumerated
powers," which is the Necessary and Proper Clause, not the Copyright and Patent Clause.
Id. at 927 (citation omitted). Moreover, Mason was speaking of monopolies in "trade and
commerce," which were terms of art in the eighteenth century, and thus would not have
included property rights defined by statute. See generally Barnett, supra note 8 (examining
the meaning of "commerce" as used in Founding Era sources). It is apparent that Mason's
and the Anti-Federalist New Yorker's concern here is with the federal government exploiting the Necessary and Proper Clause to expand its expressly enumerated power under the
Commerce Clause in granting monopolies in trade and commerce.
To be fair, Ochoa and Rose do identify statements that explicitly speak to patents and
copyrights, see Ochoa & Rose, supra note 12, at 927-28, but they are obviously attempting
to prove the Jeffersonian story of patent law by increasing the number of sources allegedly
confirming this historical claim. In doing so they conflate two very different complaints:
(1) condemnations of patents and copyrights as monopolies, and (2) condemnations of commercial monopolies. See also supra note 149 (discussing evidence of this distinction in
Madison's public condemnation of monopolies). Schwartz and Treanor make a similar
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both commercial monopolies and patents have a common ancestor in
the Crown's granting of special privileges via letters patent, they had
diverged in the law by the eighteenth century. 22 In his influential
edition of Blackstone's Commentaries, for instance, St. George Tucker
summarily rejected arguments that the Copyright and Patent Clause
permitted the government "to establish trading companies."' 23 St.
George Tucker concluded that "nothing could be more fallacious" because "such monopolies" were "incompatible" with a constitutional
provision that secured only an "exclusive right" for "authors and
24
inventors."1
The only official, public document in which a Founder expressly
discussed patents is The Federalist No. 43. There, Madison pithily justified the inclusion of the Copyright and Patent Clause in the
Constitution:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a
right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with
equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals. The States cannot
separately make effectual provision for either of the cases, and most
observation, but they focus more on "the potential breadth of powers" granted to Congress
under the Constitution that animated Mason's complaint rather than on the question of
what types of monopolies were of concern to Americans in the Founding Era. See Schwartz
& Treanor, supra note 7, at 2378 n.272.
122
See generally Mossoff, supra note 63 (tracing the evolution of patents from manufacturing monopolies in the sixteenth century to legal rights in novel inventions by the late
eighteenth century).
Prominent eighteenth-century advocates of Lockean natural rights philosophy did not
make this connection between patents for invention and commercial monopolies. In their
famous Cato's Letters, for example, Trenchard and Gordon condemned monopolies, devoting two entire essays to the subject. See 2 TRENCHARD & GORDON, supra note 93, at 643-53
(Letter No. 90, Aug. 18, 1722; Letter No. 91, Aug. 25, 1722). Their blistering critiques
focused solely on the exclusive trade monopolies granted to companies, such as the famous East-India Company's grant from the Crown for exclusive control over all commercial trade with India. See id. Notably, neither of these two essays ever mentions patents for
inventions; rather, the authors devote themselves to exposing the odious nature of commercial monopolies as violations of every person's natural rights. In other essays,
Trenchard and Gordon praise the development of arts and sciences in free countries and
recognize that the source of arts and science is "invention and industry." I TRENCHARD &
GORDON, supra note 93, at 473 (Letter No. 67, Feb. 24, 1721). This suggests that, without
additional context, one cannot legitimately infer from critiques of commercial and trade
monopolies that eighteenth-century authors would have thought the same of patents for
inventions. As with Fitch's 1786 petition, such sources are historically ambiguous in the
context of patent law. See supra notes 53, 117 and accompanying text (discussing Fitch's
1786 petition).
123

1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE TO

THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF

THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
124
Id.

266 (1803) (appendix to vol. 1).
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of them have anticipated the decision of this point by laws passed at
25
the instance of Congress.1
Today, these brief remarks are criticized more than they are approved. Thomas Nachbar, for instance, points out that Madison was
"mistaken" in grounding the legal status of patents with non-existent
English common law copyright. 126 Walterscheid further believes that
this was a vacuous justification for patents, as Madison "made no attempt to substantiate" his claim that patents and copyright served
1 27
both the public and individual good.
These critiques miss the significance of Madison's defense of the
Copyright and Patent Clause and his connection of patents to copyrights, because they fail to account for the intellectual context of the
Founding Era-the then-dominant natural rights philosophy and its
social contract doctrine. As Jefferson wrote in 1825, the Declaration
of Independence "was intended to be an expression of the American
mind" and "[a] 11 its authority rests then on the harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether expressed in conversation, in letters,
printed essays, or in the elementary books of public right, as Aristotle,
Cicero, Locke, Sidney, etc."12 8 Madison likely presumed that the readers of The FederalistPapers were aware of these basic principles, and
125

THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 43, at 271-72.

126

Thomas Nachbar, Patent and Copyright Clause, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CON-

STITUTION 120, 121 (Edwin Meese III, David F. Forte & Matthew Spalding eds., 2005); see
also Nachbar, supra note 45, at 336 n.275 (noting about Madison's defense of patents that
the "lack of a common-law patent right at the time of his writing is beyond dispute").
Providing a similar doctrinal critique, Walterscheid suggests it was unclear whether English
common law doctrines carried binding authority for American courts. See WALTERSCHEID,
supra note 12, at 202-12.
127
Edward C. Walterscheid, Musings on the Copyright Power: A Critique of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 14 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 309, 352 (2004).
128
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), reprinted in THE LIFE
AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 719 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds.,
1944).
American political and legal treatises in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
cited to and relied on the work of the natural rights philosophers. For instance, Chancellor Kent, in his famous and oft-cited Commentaries, declares that "Grotius [is] justly considered as the father of the law of nations," and he lists Pufendorf, Wolfius, Burlamaqui, and
Rutherforth as "the disciples of Grotius." 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
16-18 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., 12th ed. 1873) (1826). In a formal statement as Secretary of
State in 1793 concerning the status of treaties between the United States and France following the French Revolution, Jefferson also referred to "Grotius, Puffendorf, Wolf, and
Vattel" as philosophers who are "respected and quoted as witnesses of what is morally right
or wrong." THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 128, at
317-19. The natural rights philosophers' ideas were evident in Supreme Court decisions,
see Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 386-95 (1798) (Chase, J.), and they were considered legitimate sources of authority for courts adjudicating run-of-the-mill legal disputes.
See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); see also Mossoff, supra note 24, at
406 n.140 (listing nineteenth-century property cases that expressly relied on or cited to
natural rights philosophers and legal scholars and noting this was common practice).
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thus he need not be pedantic, saving his lengthier explanations for
the more novel ideas and institutions in the Constitution.
In setting this intellectual context, it is clear that the fulcrum of
the justification of patents in The Federalist No. 43 is Madison's claim
that patents are justified "with equal reason" as common law copyrights. 29 Madison was not alleging that patents were secured at common law, 130 which he certainly knew to be false; rather, he was
arguing that the reason why copyrights were secured at common law
was the same reason why patents should be secured by federal statute.
In other words, Madison was suggesting a connection between copyrights and patents in their policy justification, not in their technical
legal status.

By the late eighteenth century, it was well known that common
law rights were tantamount to natural rights. 13 As such, there was no
better justification for a privilege than pointing out that the policy
justification for securing it in civil society was "with equal reason" the
same policy justification for the common law protection of a similar
legal right. Notably, Madison offered this same argument for securing
civil rights, such as the right to a jury trial, when he introduced to the
First Congress the bills that became the Bill of Rights. 3 2 One can
assume "with equal reason" that the New Yorkers reading Madison's
words in The Federalist No. 43 understood this context as well as the
No. 43, supra note 43, at 272.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
131
See EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
§ 213, at 142 (14th ed. 1791) (1658) (stating that "it is to be observed, that the common
law of England sometimes is called right, sometimes common right, and sometimes communisjusticia," and that in the Magna Carta "the common law is called right"); 1 KENT,
supra note 128, at 561 (explaining that the common law is "the application of the dictates
of natural justice and of cultivated reason to particular cases").
The connection of natural justice, right, and reason is one of the central elements of
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century natural rights philosophy. See HuGo GROTIUs, THE
LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 38 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (1625) (stating as a definition
that "[t]he law of nature is a dictate of right reason"); LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, sup-ra note
81, § 6, at 271 ("The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every
one: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being
all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or
Possessions."); 1 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 201 (C.H.
Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., 1934) (1672) (stating that "[m]ost men agree on the
one point that the law of nature should be deduced from the reason of man himself, and
should flow from that source").
Accordingly, eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Anglo-American jurists continued to
identify natural law-and its derivative form, the law of nations-with the "law of reason"
or "right reason." See BLACKSTONE, supra note 85, at *40-41 (noting that "the discovery of
these first principles of the law of nature depended only upon the due exertion of right
reason ...[a]nd if our reason were always.., unclouded by prejudice ...we should need
no other guide but this"). I KENT, supra note 128, at 2-3 (recognizing that the law of
nations "derive[d] much of its force and dignity from the same principles of right reason . . . as those from which the science of morality is deduced").
132 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
129

130

THE FEDERALIST
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congressmen who heard Madison's floor speech on the Bill of Rights a
few years later.
Madison's justification for patent rights as privileges (civil rights)
becomes even clearer once one recognizes the eighteenth-century justification for securing copyrights at common law: the labor theory of
property of natural rights philosophy. 133 Several states had already
enacted statutes protecting copyrights on the ground that "there being no property more peculiarly a man's own than that which is produced by the labour of his mind." 13 4 Blackstone provided additional
support for such legislation, writing that "the right, which an author
may be supposed to have in his own original literary compositions" is a
"species of property" because it is "grounded on labour and invention." 13 5 In America, Chancellor Kent further explained that "literary
property" is "[a] nother instance of property acquired by one's own act
and power."1 36 In fact, Chancellor Kent made explicit Madison's implied policy connection between copyrights and patents by classifying
both under the heading: "Of original acquisition by intellectual labor."' 37 Here, Chancellor Kent announced the unremarkable proposition of his day that "[i] t is just that [authors and inventors] should
enjoy the pecuniary profits resulting from mental as well as bodily
1 38

labor."

By invoking the natural rights principle that one should reap the
fruits of his labor-"mental as well as bodily labor"-Chancellor Kent
also made explicit the policy justification for copyright that Madison
invoked in The FederalistNo. 43 as applying "with equal reason" to patents. In sum, Madison was not making a legal argument that patent
133 The labor theory of property was ubiquitous in the eighteenth century. As one
modern scholar puts it, "[t]he American Revolution was virtually built on the labor theory
of property/value." JAMES L. HUSTON, SECURING THE FRUITS OF LABOR 17 (1998). Cato's
Letters, for instance, announced to their English and American readers: "By liberty, I understand the power which every man has over his own actions, and his right to enjoy the fruit
And thus ... every man is sole lord and arbiter of his
of his labour, art, and industry ....
own private actions and property." 1 TRENCHARD & GORDON, supra note 93, at 427 (Letter
No. 62, Jan. 20, 1721).
134
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island all adopted copyright statutes in
1783 that contained this provision. COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES,
1783-1906, at 14, 18-19 (Thorvald Solberg ed., rev. 2d ed. 1906).
135
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *405. Blackstone directly refers to "Mr.
Locke" here and cites to the Second Treatiseas the source of this idea, but he also recognizes
through a cross-cite to his introductory chapter that there were "many others" who advanced this proposition, such as Grotius, Pufendorf, and Barbeyrac. Id.
136
2 KENT, supra note 128, at 497. American jurists relied on Kent's Commentaries in
adjudicating patent disputes. See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 269
(1850) (Woodbury, J., dissenting) (quoting from Kent's Commentaries in leading nineteenth-century Court decision applying what is now known as the nonobviousness doctrine
in 35 U.S.C. § 103).
137
2 KENT, supra note 128, at 497.
138
Id.

2007]

REEVALUATING THE PATENT "PRIVILEGE"

983

rights were secured at common law-an argument that he surely understood as false-but rather he was justifying these civil rights with
the same labor-desertpolicy justifying the common law (natural right) in
copyright. Without this context, of course, Madison's brief remarks in
The FederalistNo. 43 are easily misinterpreted, or, at the very least, their
significance is lost on the modern reader who lacks the cultural con139
text of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Madison's purpose in justifying patents as privileges on par with
other civil rights, such as the right to a jury trial, is further established
by his concluding remark in The Federalist No. 43 that the "states cannot separately make effectual provision" for either copyrights or patents. In other words, these privileges can only be secured effectively
through national legislation. Here, the presumption of patents as
privileges-rights secured expressly by legislation-is complete.
Thus, the federal Constitution preempted various state enactments to
secure copyright and patent privileges, such as South Carolina's 1784
statute, which provided that inventors "shall have a like exclusive privilege ...

under the same privileges and restrictions hereby granted to,

and imposed on, the authors of books."' 140 The textual structure of
South Carolina's statute reflected the natural rights understanding of
privilege, as it secured "privileges" (i.e., exclusive rights) and imposed
separate "restrictions" (i.e., term limitations) on those rights. Unsurprisingly, this same structure is reflected in the Copyright and Patent
Clause, which secures "the exclusive Right" for inventors but only "for
14 1
limited Times."
If only this were the end of the story, as the historical record is
rarely so straightforward. Madison was inconsistent in his public and
private writings on the nature of patent rights. 142 In private correspondence in 1788 with the eponymous source of the Jeffersonian
139
This fundamental normative connection between property and patents also illuminates Madison's seemingly strange remark in The Federalist No. 43 that the "public good
fully coincides. .. with the claims of individuals." THE FEDERALIST No. 43, supra note 43, at
272. This statement also must be construed in the intellectual context in which it was
written, i.e., within the framework of natural rights philosophy that viewed all rights as
securing the means for human happiness. See Mossoff, supra note 24, at 412 n.166 (discussing consequentialist nature of natural law and natural rights philosophy). Modern academics read such remarks as utilitarian, but it is a mistake to conflate consequentialism
with utilitarianism, which is a species of consequentialism. See OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 388 (1996) (defining utilitarianism as "a form of consequentialism"). In this respect, the Eldred Court was cor-ect that Americans in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries viewed labor and consequentialist theories of copyrights (and patents) as "complementary." Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003).
140
COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 134, at 21, 23.
141
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
142
Proponents of the Jeffersonian story of patent law emphasize this fact. See, e.g.,
Tom W. Bell, Escapefrom Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failurein the Protection of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REv. 741, 770-74 (2001) (reviewing the correspondence between
Jefferson and Madison in 1788 and thus concluding that Madison "appears not to have
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story of patent law, Madison adopted the language and arguments
thatJefferson used in his famous letter to McPherson. After Madison
sent Jefferson a copy of the Constitution (Jefferson was in France),
Jefferson provided Madison with some general commentary, including a request for an additional constitutional provision that would
prohibit the federal government from granting "monopolies."' 4 3 In
his reply, Madison rejected Jefferson's request, but he ratified Jeffer144
son's reference to patents and copyrights as "monopolies."'
Madison further defended these monopolies with the same utilitarian
argument that Jefferson would later use to justify the "embarrassment
of an exclusive patent" to McPherson: "But is it clear that as encouragements to literary works and ingenious discoveries, they are not too
valuable to be wholly renounced?'

45

Madison repeated this senti-

ment in an undated note, published posthumously in 1946, in which
he claimed that, with respect to "authors of Books, and of useful inventions ... [t]here can be no just objection to a temporary monop146
oly in these cases.
The disconnect between Madison's public remarks in The Federalist No. 43 and his private notes and correspondence is intriguing. It is,
of course, too easy to dismiss his statements in The FederalistNo. 43 as
politically motivated rhetoric, 147 as these essays were published in
newspapers as part of the public debate swirling around New York's
ratification convention. Perhaps Madison was more willing to be honest with Jefferson, particularly in private correspondence, than he was
when debating Anti-Federalists about whether the states should ratify
the Constitution.
If true, though, this criticism cuts against the Jeffersonian story of
patent law because it confirms a key point in the earlier analysis of
patent privileges within the social contract doctrine of natural rights
philosophy. The exchange between Jefferson and Madison raises an
held a natural rights view of copyright"); Ochoa & Rose, supra note 12, at 925-26 (quoting
correspondence between Jefferson and Madison).
Ochoa & Rose, supra note 12, at 925 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
143
James Madison (July 31, 1788)).
Id. at 925-26 (quoting Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17,
144
1788)).
145
Id. at 926. Chancellor Kent also wrote that one of the justifications for copyright
was the need for authors to be "stimulated to the most active exertion of the powers of
genius, in the production of works useful to the country and instructive to mankind." 2
KENT, supra note 128, at 497. However, this does not necessarily contradict his advocacy of
the labor theory of copyright and patents, as natural rights philosophy justified the labor
theory of property as serving consequentialist purposes. See supra note 139 (discussing consequentialist nature of natural rights philosophy).
146
James Madison, Detached Memoranda, in WRITINGS 745, 756 (Jack N. Rakove ed.,
1999). Again, this writing has been highlighted by advocates of the Jeffersonian story of
patent law. See, e.g., Ochoa & Rose, supra note 12, at 928 (quoting same).
147
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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interesting question: assuming that Madison agreed with Jefferson's
view of patents and copyrights, why did he not repeat the content of
his letter to Jefferson when he justified the Copyright and Patent
Clause in The Federalist No. 43? It is possible that Madison knew that
New Yorkers (and other Americans) would not have found such arguments compelling; they may have disagreed with the central premise
of the Jeffersonian story of patent law that patents were odious mo-

nopoly privileges saved from condemnation because of their social
utility. They likely did not agree with the Jeffersonian story of patent
law because the arguments that Madison actually made in The Federalist No. 43 resonated with their pre-existing ideas. In other words, this
confirms that natural rights philosophy and its social contract doctrine defined the basic social and political norms of early American
society.1 4 8 The Jeffersonian story of patent law survives today in court
opinions and scholarship precisely because it represents a historical
claim about the public understandingof patent law. If Madison recognized that his public statements had to be framed in natural rights
terminology, even if he personally disagreed with such arguments,
then this only indicates the degree to which the Jeffersonian story of
patent law indeed takes elements of the historical public record out of
49
context. 1
2.

Wheaton v. Peters and Patents as Privileges

The Supreme Court's 1834 decision in Wheaton v. Peters15 0 plays
an important role in the Jeffersonian story of patent law, deserving
therefore its own treatment. Although Wheaton was a copyright case,
the arguments by counsel and the majority and dissenting opinions
canvassed the nature of both the copyright and patent statutes enacted by Congress pursuant to the Copyright and Patent Clause. In
essence, the Court held that the Constitution did not secure a preexisting natural right to copyright or patent, and that such rights were
defined and secured only by the statutes that the Constitution empowered Congress to enact.'15 Accordingly, intellectual property professors and historians often cite Wheaton as conclusive proof of the
See supra notes 128-41 and accompanying text.
Further evidence of the public understanding of patents as legitimate property
rights is found in Madison's famous essay, "Property," which was published in the National
Gazette on March 29, 1792. Madison, Property, supra note 146, at 515-17. There, Madison
excoriated "arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies" imposed by government
fiat as violations of the citizens' property rights. Id. at 516. He illustrated these unjust
.monopolies" by referencing examples of exclusive commercialfranchise, he did not mention
patents or copyrights. See id. at 515-17. This is another example of how eighteenth-century scholars and politicians distinguished between odious commercial monopolies and
legitimate property rights in patents. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
150 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
151
See id. at 657-58.
148
149
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Jeffersonian story of patent law. 15 2 In sum, we are told that Wheaton
confirms that patents (and copyrights) were merely special grants of
monopoly privileges justified solely by their social utility.
The significance of Wheaton reaches beyond the confines of intellectual property law, 153 but for the purposes of this Article, it is important only to explain how patent rights became implicated in a
copyright dispute between two of the original reporters of Supreme
Court decisions. In his lawsuit against Peters, Wheaton claimed a
common law copyright in his Supreme Court reports, and thus he recognized very early in the case the pressing need to distinguish copyright from patent law because "[t] here is at common law no property
in [patents]. '"154 Wheaton further explained to the Supreme Court:

"Although united in this clause [in the Constitution], and for the
same purpose of being secured by congress, the subjects of patents
and of copyrights have little analogy. They are so widely different,
that the one is property, the other a legalized monopoly."' 55 Given
that Wheaton based his legal claims in common law copyright, the
game was lost for him if the Court viewed copyrights and patents as
equivalent monopoly privileges granted by Congress. Thus, from the
outset, counsel raised arguments concerning the nature of patents in
disputing whether reports of Supreme Court decisions were secured
by copyright.
As would be expected, Peters maintained in his defense that copyright and patent were "[a] nalogous rights," because neither required
"actual possession and use," which was the well-known standard for
recognizing property rights at common law (and justified by the natural law). 1 56 Peters further noted that the Court had already established this in its patent lawjurisprudence, as it was now settled law that
152
See, e.g., LvAN RAy PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 209 (1968)
("The basic premise in the majority opinion [in Wheaton] was simply that copyright is a
monopoly."); WALTERSCHEID, supra note 12, at 232 (summarizing the Wheaton decision that
"the intellectual property clause refers only to a grant of authority to Congress to create a
future right and not to the protection of an existing right"); Ochoa & Rose, supra note 12,
at 935 (concluding from their survey of Wheaton that in "rejecting Wheaton's claim of perpetual common-law copyright, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed the utilitarian view embodied in the Constitution").
153
See generally Craig Joyce, "A Curious Chapter in the History ofJudicature":Wheaton v.
Peters and the Rest of the Story (of Copyright in the New Republic), 42 Hous. L. REV. 325 (2005)
(analyzing the impact of Wheaton on law reporting).
154
Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 600.
155

Id. at 598.

Id. at 626; see alsoJohnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823) (discussing the discovery rule by which "title might be consummated by possession"); Pierson v.
Post, 3 Cai. 175, 176-77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (discussing the rule of capture as an application of the rule of first possession); GRoTtUs, supra note 131, at 296 ("Now the first method
of acquiring property, which by the Romans was ascribed to the law of nations, is the taking
possession of that which belongs to no one. This method is without doubt in accord with
the law of nature ....").
156
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mere public disclosure of an invention prior to applying for a patent
would defeat an inventor's right to receive the patent. 5 7 He framed
the public disclosure rule in patent law in terms of the first-possession
requirement at common law, noting, "let an inventor lose his possession, and his privilege is gone."' 158 An inventor's inability in securing
exclusive possession in the use of his invention explained why this "deficiency is wisely and justly supplied" by "the positive provisions" in the
Constitution and in express statutes, and thus "is not to be found in
natural law or common law."15 9 He concluded that the Copyright and
Patent Clause did not "secure" any pre-existing natural right in copyright, because "[i]n inventions, it is admitted, there was no common
60

law property." 1

Perhaps sensing the Justices' receptiveness to Peters's argument,
one of Wheaton's attorneys (the famed Daniel Webster) invoked the
labor theory of property in his closing argument. He asked, in seemingly rhetorical fashion, whether there has "been an indefensible use
of the [plaintiffs] labours?"1 6 1 The answer was obviously yes, as an
author has "[t] he right.., to the production of his mind," and thus it
"is his property. It may be true that it is property which requires extraordinary legislative protection, and also limitation. Be it so."162
With both parties using patents as the foil to understand the status of copyright-Wheaton arguing common law right and Peters arguing statutory privilege-the Court's decision weighed in favor of
statutory privilege. Without repeating Peters's sophisticated legal
analysis concerning the Copyright and Patent Clause, Justice McLean's opinion for the Court stated simply, "the word secure, as used in
the constitution ...

refers to inventors, as well as authors, and it has

never been pretended, by any one, either in this country or in England, that an inventor has a perpetual right, at common law." 1 63 The
164
conclusion was clear: if the common law protected natural rights
and patents were not protected at common law, then patents (and by
157 See Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 625-26. Here, Peters cited Justice Story's decision in Pennock
v.Dialogue. See 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23-24 (1829) (holding "that the first inventor cannot
acquire a good title to a patent; if he suffers the thing invented to go into public use, or to
be publicly sold for use, before he makes application for a patent"). The modern analog is
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (providing that an inventor forfeits his right to a patent if he
permits the invention to be publicly disclosed more than a year before filing his patent
application).
158 Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 625 (emphasis added).
159
160
161
162

Id. at 626.
Id. at 641.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 653.

163 Id. at 661; see also id. at 658 (noting that "it has never been pretended" that an
inventor possessed "by the common law, any property in his invention, after he shall have
sold it publicly").
164
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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implication copyrights) were not protected under the Constitution as
natural rights. In a significant antebellum copyright case, the Wheaton
Court seemingly declared the truth of the Jeffersonian story of patent
law.
But this now-familiar account of Wheaton's supporting role in the
Jeffersonian story of patent law fails to take into account what the attorneys and Justices were actually saying. First, it is remarkable that
the central thesis of the Jeffersonian story of patent law-that a patent
was a special legal privilege saved from condemnation and granted to
an inventor only because of its social utility-is glaringly absent from
the Wheaton decision. A single attorney's reference to a patent as a
"legalized monopoly" stands alone as the only evidence of the Jeffersonian story of patent law in this vital, early decision on the legal status
of copyrights and patents.

65

Second, neither the Justices nor the attorneys, not even Daniel
Webster, argued that there was a common law right to a patent. 166 As
confirmed by Peters's winning argument before the Court, in which
he referred to a patent as a "privilege,"'16 7 everyone agreed that patent
rights were secured by statute-patents were privileges. The question
was what type of privilege: special monopoly grant or civil right securing a property right?
The Wheaton decision confirmed that the Justices and at least
some of the attorneys viewed patents as statutory rights on par with
similar civil rights derived from the social compact. This is evidenced
in the Wheaton Court adopting Webster's appeal to the labor theory of
property, 68 despite rejecting his legal conclusion, and then using this
labor theory tojustify securing copyright by statute: "That every man is
entitled to the fruits of his own labour must be admitted; but he can
enjoy them only, except by statutory provision, under the rules of
property, which regulate society, and which define the rights of things
in general."1 69 In other words, certain types of property can be pro165
Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 598. The attorney, Mr. Paine, qualified this reference, timidly
suggesting that copyright "is a natural right, [but] the [patent] is in some measure against
natural right." Id. Mr. Paine's qualification of patents as contradicting natural rights only
"in some measure" undermines the claim scholars make today that Wheaton clearly supports the Jeffersonian story of patent law. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
166
Even Justice Thompson refused to make such a claim, despite his vigorous and
caustic dissent blasting the majority opinion for failing to recognize that "every principle of
justice, equity, morality, fitness and sound policy concurs, in protecting the literary labours
of men, to the same extent that property acquired by manual labour is protected." Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 672 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
167
Id. at 625.
168
See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
169
Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 658. With respect to the Court's use of "regulation," see Claeys,
supra note 70, at 1553-55, 1571-74 (discussing how nineteenth-century jurists influenced
by natural rights philosophy defined "regulation" differently than how this term is used in
the twentieth century).
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tected only in civil society, and we identify these important civil rights
by reference to the same policy that justifies natural rights in property-securing to each person the fruits of his labors.
Significantly, this was the same policy justification that Madison
obliquely referenced in The Federalist No. 43170 and that Chancellor
Kent developed more explicitly in his Commentaries.'7' It was a policy
argument that was derived from the social contract doctrine of natural
rights philosophy, which ultimately defined and justified the fundamental privileges in property secured in civil society for all citizens. 172
In its proper historical context, Wheaton corroborates that patents
were privileges-civil rights in property justified by the same labordesert policy animating the natural right to property.
The background political and constitutional context for The Federalist No. 43 and Wheaton reveals how these two significant texts in the
history of American patent law reflect a social contractjustification for
patent rights within natural rights philosophy. Without first understanding the definition of privileges as civil rights justified by the same
policies as natural rights-such as Madison's reference to patents as
justified "with equal reason" as the labor theory of common law copyright-this important historical justification for patents is lost on modern readers. As will be seen in Part III, this intellectual context also is
necessary in exploring the evolution of American patent law in the
early nineteenth century. It explains why patents were expressly iden-

tified as "privileges," and accordingly received expansive and favorable
treatment by both Congress and the courts as securing important and
valuable property rights.
III
THE PATENT PRIVILEGE IN EARI-V AMERICAN PATENT LAW

Understanding the background social and political context of
natural rights philosophy-its labor theory of property and attendant
social contract doctrine-is necessary in understanding American
constitutional and legal doctrines in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. As shown in Part II, this intellectual context
elucidates previously misunderstood texts, such as The FederalistNo. 43
and Wheaton. As this Part further explains, this context is equally necessary to understand the early evolution of American patent law,
which grew dramatically in both statutory and judicially-created doctrines in the antebellum period.
170
171
172

See supra note 125-35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 84-105 and accompanying text.
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This growth seems puzzling at first. If it were true that early
Americans believed that patents were special legal privileges saved
from condemnation given only their social utility, then patents would
have been treated as Lessig and others claim they were: Congress and
courts would have viewed patents as extremely limited and circumscribed legal entitlements. 173 In fact, the government would have
treated patents no differently than other special grants of legal monopolies, such as the extremely limited rights accorded to owners of
7
public franchises in bridges.1

4

The historical record reveals the exact opposite. Indeed, Congress and courts construed patents as privileges: they were civil rights
in property afforded expansive and liberal protection under the law.
This is evidenced by the reliance on property case law and rhetoric in
patent cases, the development of legal presumptions favoring a liberal
interpretation of both the patent statutes and patents, and in the judicial recognition of additional rights beyond those expressly provided
in the patent statutes. Moreover, Congress repeatedly granted patent
term extensions to individual inventors and, in the 1836 Patent Act,
provided all patentees with a seven-year term extension on the basis of
an express labor-desert policy. 175 None of this has been discussed in
modern court opinions, intellectual property scholarship, or historical
studies. It is the purpose of Part III to illuminate this previously undiscovered country in the history of American patent law-revealing that
patents were treated as privileges under the guiding hand of natural
rights philosophy.
A.

Patents as Privileges in Nineteenth-Century Case Law

Beyond the confines of popular political pamphlets and copyright decisions, nineteenth-century case law leaves little doubt that
many jurists considered patents to be privileges in the technical, legal
sense. In fact, Wheaton confirms that lawyers, jurists, and scholars
agreed that a patent was neither a natural right nor a common law
right. 176 In 1862, a district court could declare with little fear of being
See supra Part I (discussing the Jeffersonian story of patent law); see also VAIDHY49, at 11 (claiming that "in the American tradition," copyright "was
originally a narrow federal policy that granted a limited trade monopoly in exchange for
universal use and access").
174
See Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837); see also
supra note 58 (discussing CharlesRiver Bridge decision as embodying prevailing anti-monopolist views of Jacksonian period).
175
See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 18, 5 Stat. 117, 124 (repealed 1861).
176
See supra note 166 and accompanying text. However, by the eighteenth century,
patents were adjudicated solely in the common law courts, as the 1623 Statute of Monopolies required. See Mossoff, supra note 63, at 1276-87, 1313-14 (discussing shift in eighteenth century from the Privy Council to the common law courts as the fora in which patent
disputes were adjudicated in England).
173

ANATHAN, supra note
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misunderstood: "The patent itself, with all the privileges which it con"177 Patents were privilegesfers, is the creature of the statute .
civil rights securing to inventors "the fruition of their labors" for
' 178
which this "privilege is granted."
Throughout the nineteenth century, courts reaffirmed their view
of patents as civil rights on par with contract and property rights similarly identified as privileges.1 79 One federal court, for instance, held
that an assignment of patent rights to a third party required the court
to recognize that "the patentee grants the exclusive local privilege to
the utmost and fullest extent." 18°1 The court's repeated references to
patent rights conferred by the assignment contract as "the local privilege" reflects that privilege was a basic norm of legal discourse at the
time. 8 1 Similarly, another court rejected a patentee's "precise and
rigid" reading of the "privilege" conferred in a license, observing that
the patentee was "seeking to deprive a party of a privilege for which he
undoubtedly paid a full consideration."1 82 These are but a few examples of the widespread legal norm in nineteenth-century patent law
jurisprudence to refer to patents as privileges-a norm predicated on
a wider socio-political context informed by natural rights philosophy. 8 3 It would be anachronistic to interpret these court decisions as
Jacobs v. Hamilton County, 13 F. Cas. 276, 278 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1862) (No. 7,161).
Goodyear v. Hills, 10 F. Cas. 689, 690 (C.C.D.C. 1866) (No. 5,571a) (bemoaning
the unfortunate fact that for many inventors to whom "the privilege is granted are never to
1861) (No.
see the fruition of their labors"); Cox v. Griggs, 6 F. Cas. 678, 679 (C.C.N.D. Ill.
3,302) (explaining that it is "the right and privilege of a party, when an idea enters his
177
178

mind in the essential form of an invention ...

to perfect ... his original idea, so as not to

be deprived of the fruit of his skill").
179 See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text (discussing identification of contract
and other rights as privileges by Chief Justice Marshall, Justice Washington, and others).
180
Chase v. Walker, 5 F. Cas. 524, 525 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1866) (No. 2,630).
181

Id. at 525-26.

182 Belding v. Turner, 3 F. Cas. 84, 85 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 1,243).
183 See, e.g., Henry v. Providence Tool Co., 11 F. Cas. 1182, 1183 (C.C.D.R.I. 1878) (No.
6,384) (noting that the "privileges which the act of congress grants to an inventor" are
provided to an inventor through both "show[ing] his right by invention" and by his exercising "[v]igilance" in securing the patent); Johnson v. Beard, 13 F. Cas. 728, 730
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 7,371) (recognizing the "exclusive privilege legally vested" in a
plaintiff-patentee); Dorsey Revolving Harvester Rake Co.v. Bradley Mfg. Co., 7 F. Cas. 946,
947 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 4,015) (recognizing right of patentee to convey "qualified
privilege" to licensees); Cahart v. Austin, 4 F. Cas. 997, 1000 (C.C.D.N.H. 1865) (No. 2,288)
(identifying the reissue right provided in § 13 of the 1836 Patent Act as a "privilege");
Goodyear v. Bishop, 10 F. Cas. 642, 645 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 5,559) (explaining how
plaintiff-assignees were "the exclusive owners of the privileges"); Bray v. Hartshorn, 4 F.
Cas. 38, 39-40 (C.C.D. Mass. 1860) (No. 1,820) ("Invention or discovery is required as the
proper foundation of a patent, and, where both are wanting, the applicant cannot legally
secure the privilege."); Beach v. Tucker, 2 F. Cas. 1102, 1104 (C.C.D.C.1860) (No. 1,153)
(construing rights to use or convey under 1839 Patent Act as "privilege[s] granted.., only
to the inventor"); Goodyear v. Beverly Rubber Co., 10 F. Cas. 638, 640 (C.C.D. Mass. 1859)
(No. 5,557) (identifying for "[i]nventors ....[t]hose privileges [that] constitute the rights
secured to them by their letters-patent"); Ellithorp v. Robertson, 8 F. Cas. 562, 565
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holding that contract and patent rights were merely specially conferred grants of benefits to citizens.
Significantly, a "Note" in one of the Federal Cases reporters further
explains this background context for American patent law.18 4 (This
brief, anonymous essay has never been discussed in any monographs
or court opinions.) The Note recognized the basic legal truth that a
patent was a "privilege," as "[t] he exclusive right to an invention can
only have existence by virtue of some positive law."' 1 5 In England,
where patents were given as a "grant by the crown," the Note explained, the patentee's "right has been regarded a personal privilege,
inalienable unless power to that effect is given by the crown."'1 6 In
the United States, however, the patent statutes provided that patents
could be conveyed by their owners, which meant that the patent "is
then defined as an incorporeal chattel, which the patent impresses
with all the characteristics of personal estate."' 87 In sum, patents were
privileges-civil rights securing property rights.
B.

The Framing of Patent Privileges as Property Rights

In defining patents as privileges-civil rights securing property
rights-courts felt no compunction in identifying patents as property
and treating them as such. Federal courts recognized that they had
primary jurisdiction over this species of property, despite the typical
adjudication of property rights in state common law courts, because
patents represented a "right and property created under the federal
statutes.' 188 Accordingly, judges instructed juries that a "patent right,
gentlemen, is a right given to a man by law where he has a valid patent, and, as a legal right, is just as sacred as any right of property."' 8 9
In this way, another court noted, a patent secured for an inventor the
right to "enjoy the fruits of his invention" because "it is his property."' 9 0 Such property rhetoric was not unusual, as references to pat(C.C.D.C. 1858) (No. 4,409) (identifying "the right" secured to an inventor under the 1836
Patent Act as "the privilege"); Blanchard's Gun-Stock Turning Factory v. Warner, 3 F. Cas.
653, 657 (C.C.D. Conn. 1846) (No. 1,521) (recognizing power in Congress to provide a
patentee the ability to transfer to assignees his "rights and privileges"); Bryan v. Stevens, 4
F. Cas. 510, 511 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1841) (No. 2,066a) (recognizing that a right conferred to a
licensee by a patentee "is but a privilege under the patent").
184
See 3 F. Cas. at 85 (following Belding v. Turner).
185
Id.
186 Id.
187
Id.; see also Carew v. Boston Elastic Fabric Co., 5 F. Cas. 56, 57 (C.C.D. Mass. 1871)
(No. 2,398) (explaining that "the rights conferred by the patent law, being property, have
the incidents of property, and are capable of being transmitted by descent or devise, or
assigned by grant").
188
Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Willis, 10 F. Cas. 754, 755 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1874)
(No. 5,603).
189 Hayden v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 11 F. Cas. 900, 901 (C.C.D. Mass. 1862) (No. 6,261).
190
Hawes v. Gage, 11 F. Cas. 867, 867 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 6,237).
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ents as property are omnipresent in nineteenth-century patent law
jurisprudence.' 9 ' Courts thus accused patent infringers of committing trespass' 9 2 and, even more commonly, piracy.' 9 3
191 See, e.g.,
Allen v. NewYork, I F. Cas. 506, 508 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 232) (recognizing that "the [patent] right is a species of property"); Henry v. Providence Tool Co., 11
F. Cas. 1182, 1185 (C.C.D.R.I. 1878) (No. 6,384) (rejecting the argument by the plaintiff as
this would "make the rights of property in this country depend upon the discretion exercised by a foreign sovereign"); Hamilton v. Rollins, 11 F. Cas. 364, 365 (C.C.D. Minn. 1877)
(No. 5,988) (distinguishing claims in tort from patent infringement claims, which are
"property" claims in that they are capable of "assignment"); Holbrook v. Small, 12 F. Cas.
324, 325 (C.C.D. Mass. 1876) (No. 6,595) (referring to patents at issue in the case as "the
property of the plaintiffs"); Henry v. Francestown Soap-Stone Stove Co., 11 F. Cas. 1180,
1181 (C.C.D.N.H. 1876) (No. 6,382) (referring to the "property in the letters patent"); Ball
v. Withington, 2 F. Cas. 556, 557 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1874) (No. 815) (noting simply that patents are a "species of property"); Carew, 5 F. Cas. at 57 (explaining that "the rights conferred by the patent law, being property, have the incidents of property"); Lightner v.
Kimball, 15 F. Cas. 518, 519 (C.C.D. Mass. 1868) (No. 8,345) (noting that "every person
who intermeddles with a patentee's property ...is liable to an action at law for damages");
Ayling v. Hull, 2 F. Cas. 271, 273 (C.C.D.Mass. 1865) (No. 686) (discussing the "right to
enjoy the property of the invention"); Gay v. Cornell, 10 F. Cas. 110, 112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1849) (No. 5,280) (recognizing that "an invention is, within the contemplation of the patent laws, a species of property"); Bryan v. Stevens, 4 F. Cas. 510, 511 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1841)
(No. 2,066a) (dismissing plaintiffs as lacking standing as they have "no direct and absolute
property in this patent"); Gray v. James, 10 F. Cas. 1019, 1021 (C.C.D. Pa. 1817) (No.
5,719) (Washington, Circuit Justice) (referring to a breach of a patent as "an unlawful
invasion of property").
192
See Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Van Antwerp, 10 F. Cas. 749, 750 (C.C.D.N.J.
1876) (No. 5,600) (analogizing patent infringement to a "trespass" of horse stables and
unauthorized use of horses in determining a rule for damages owed to a patentee); Burleigh Rock-Drill Co.v. Lobdell, 4 F. Cas. 750, 751 (C.C.D. Mass. 1875) (No. 2,166) (noting
that the defendants "honestly believ[ed] that they were not trespassing upon any rights of
the complainant"); Livingston vJones, 15 F. Cas. 669, 674 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 8,414)
(accusing defendants of having "made large gains by trespassing on the rights of the complainants"); Case v. Redfield, 5 F. Cas. 258, 259 (C.C.D. Ind. 1849) (No. 2,494) (analogizing a plaintiffs ability to split a patent infringement claim to a plaintiffs ability to split a
trespass claim for land held under "distinct titles"); Eastman v. Bodfish, 8 F. Cas. 269, 270
(C.C.D. Me. 1841) (No. 4,255) (Story, Circuit Justice) (comparing evidentiary rules in a
patent infringement case to relevant evidentiary rules in a trespass action); cf Goodyear
Dental Vulcanite Co. v. White, 10 F. Cas. 752, 752 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 5,602) (referring to plaintiff's "exclusive possession" of the patent and defendant's "well knowing the
premises" in his breach of the boundaries of the patent right).
19SeePennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 12 (1829) (Story, J.) (recognizing that
"if the invention should be pirated, the use or knowledge[ ] obtained by the piracy" would
not prevent the inventor from obtaining a patent); Irwin v. McRoberts, 13 F. Cas. 124, 124
(C.C.N.D. Ill. 1879) (No. 7,085) ("I know patentees are much troubled with piracies upon
their inventions .... ); Am. Diamond Rock Boring Co. v. Sullivan Mach. Co., I F. Cas. 641,
643 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1877) (No. 298) (recognizing that a mechanical equivalent "is a piracy
of the principle, and a violation of the patent"); Goodyear v. Mullee, 10 F. Cas. 707, 708
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1868) (No. 5,579) (noting that a follow-on inventor who makes an improvement "can not pirate the original invention"); Goodyear v. Evans, 10 F. Cas. 685, 687
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 5,571) (recognizing "extraordinary exertions" by the patentee
"to prevent piracies"); Goodyear v. Dunbar, 10 F. Cas. 684, 685 (C.C.D.N.J. 1860) (No.
5,570) (noting the defendant's claim that "he has a just defence, and is not a willful pirate
of the plaintiffs invention"); Ex parte Ball, 2 F. Cas. 550, 552 (C.C.D.C. 1860) (No. 810)
(noting that patentees must be protected from "invasion by pretended inventors and pirates, and from the effect of subtle, refined distinctions"); Page v. Ferry, 18 F. Cas. 979, 985

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:953

Beyond using property rhetoric, courts treated patents as property in more substantive, legally precise ways. They identified a patent
as a "title" that was possessed and owned by a patentee, 94 and,accordingly, they identified multiple owners of a patent as "tenants in com(C.C.E.D. Mich. 1857) (No. 10,662) (charging the jury that if the defendant's machine
.obtained by mechanical equivalents [the same result as plaintiff-patentee's invention], it
would certainly constitute an infringement" because "it is a piracy of the principle"); Batten v. Silliman, 2 F. Cas. 1028, 1029 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1855) (No. 1,106) (decrying the defendant's "pirating an invention, the title to which has been clearly established either by trial
at law, or by long and peaceable possession"); Goodyear v. Cent. Rubber Co. of N.J., 10 F.
Cas. 664, 667 (C.C.D.N.J. 1853) (No. 5,563) (Grier, Circuit Justice) (noting that it is "evident that such person is pirating the plaintiff's invention" when the defendant made only
minor "variations" in plaintiffs patented product); Buck v. Cobb, 4 F. Cas. 546, 547
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 2,079) (recognizing patent law policy in construing "patent
rights" with a "favoring eye" as an effort to "secure to inventors the rewards of their genius
against the incursions of pirates"); Dobson v. Campbell, 7 F. Cas. 783, 785 (C.C.D. Me.
1833) (No. 3,945) (Story, CircuitJustice) (concluding that the patent-assignee had been
injured by "the piracy of the defendant"); Grant v. -,
10 F. Cas. 985, 985 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1829) (No. 5,701) (noting that the patented machine had "been pirated" by many different people in several states); Earle v. Sawyer, 8 F. Cas. 254, 257 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No.
4,247) (Story, Circuit Justice) (instructing the jury that "piracy by making and using the
[patented] machine" justifies an injunction); Moody v. Fiske, 17 F. Cas. 655, 656-57
(C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (No. 9,745) (Story, CircuitJustice) (referring repeatedly to infringers
of both patents and copyrights as "pirates").
Infringers of patents were also accused of committing "fraud." See, e.g., Davis v.
Palmer, 7 F. Cas. 154, 159 (C.C.D. Va. 1827) (No. 3,645) (Marshall, Circuit Justice) (instructing the jury that if "the imitator attempted to copy the [patented] model" and made
an "almost imperceptible variation, for the purpose of evading the right of the patentee,"
then "this may be considered as a fraud on the law"); Dixon v. Moyer, 7 F. Cas. 758, 759
(C.C.D. Pa. 1821) (No. 3,931) (Washington, CircuitJustice) (explaining that an attempt to
make a "mere formal difference" between a patented device and an infringing copy is "a
fraudulent evasion of the plaintiffs right").
194
See Franz & Pope Knitting-Mach. Co. v. Lamb Knitting-Mach. Mfg. Co., 9 F. Cas.
721, 722 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1881) (No. 5,061a) (recognizing that "the title to said letters patent.., is duly vested" in the plaintiffs); Birdsall v. McDonald, 3 F. Cas. 441, 444 (C.C.N.D.
Ohio 1874) (No. 1,434) (stating that "patents are [an inventor's] title deeds"); Ashcroft v.
Walworth, 2 F. Cas. 24, 24 (C.C.D. Mass. 1872) (No. 580) (stating that the patent statute
requires "a written instrument, signed by the owner of the patent and duly recorded in the
patent office, as necessary to vest the legal title in the purchaser" of a patent); Earth Closet
Co. v. Fenner, 8 F. Cas. 261, 263 (C.C.D.R.I. 1871) (No. 4,249) (observing the rule that the
"patent is prima facie proof of title"); Blandy v. Griffith, 3 F. Cas. 675, 679 (C.C.S.D. Ohio
1869) (No. 1,529) (Swayne, CircuitJustice) (recognizing that the "tides" in patents "are as
much property as anything else, real or incorporeal"); Hayden, 11 F. Cas. at 902 (recognizing that a validly issued patent establishes a "prima facie case for the plaintiff in the question of tide"); Goodyear v. Bishop, 10 F. Cas. 642, 643 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 5,559)
(noting that the plaintiffs "hold their title to the exclusive right to manufacture" the patent); Carr v. Rice, 5 F. Cas. 140, 146 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1856) (No. 2,440) (noting that the
patentees had "perfect title" to the patent); Clum v. Brewer, 5 F. Cas. 1097, 1102 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1855) (No. 2,909) (Curtis, Circuit Justice) (referring to the "title of an inventor");
Bryan, 4 F. Cas. at 511 (referring to patentees who have "titles" in their property and thus
can "sue for a violation of it"); Dobson, 7 F. Cas. at 785 (identifying conveyance of "title" in a
patent via a "deed"); Evans v. Kremer, 8 F. Cas. 874, 875 (C.C.D. Pa. 1816) (No. 4,565)
(Washington, Circuit Justice) (noting that the plaintiff-patentee must "be prepared to
maintain his title, in relation to the question of original discovery").
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mon." 195 In a patent infringement trial in 1846, for instance, the
court instructed the jury that "[a]n inventor holds a property in his
96
invention by as good a title as the farmer holds his farm and flock."'
The classification of patents as "titles" was particularly instructive,
as this led courts to utilize a familiar conceptual framework in (tangible) property law: the distinction between inchoate versus choate
rights. In sum, discovery or first possession provided a landowner with
an inchoate right that is perfected by securing a title.' 97 The courts
declared the same was true for inventions. For instance, in one early
patent dispute, ChiefJustice Marshall, riding circuit, referred to a prepatented invention as an "inchoate and indefeasible property."' 98
This "inchoate property which [is] vested by the discovery," 19 9 he explained, is "perfected by the patent." 20 0 He concluded that it was the
"constitution and law, taken together, [that gave] to the inventor,
from the moment of invention, an inchoate property therein, which is
completed by suing out a patent."20 1 A short time later, the famed
attorney, John Sergeant, succeeded brilliantly in the equally famous
1829 patent case, Pennock v. Dialogue,20 2 with his argument that an act
of invention established an
inchoate right; that is, a right to have a title upon complying with
the terms and conditions of the law. It is like an inchoate right to
land, or an inceptive right to land, well known in some of the states,
and every where accompanied with the condition, that to be made
available, it must be prosecuted with3 due diligence, to the consum20
mation or completion of the title.
See Dunham v. Indianapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co., 8 F. Cas. 44, 45 (C.C.N.D. Ill.
195
1876) (No. 4,151) ("The patentees are tenants in common of the right."); Clum, 5 F. Cas. at
1103 (holding that multiple owners of undivided interests in a patent are "tenants in
common").
196
Hovey v. Henry, 12 F. Cas. 603, 604 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 6,742) (Woodbury,
Circuit Justice).
197
See BLACKSTONE, supra note 135, at *311-12; see also De La Croix v. Chamberlain, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 599, 600-01 (1827) (noting that "actual possession" established an "inchoate right, but not a perfect legal estate" that could support "an action of ejectment");
Pearsall v. Post, 20 Wend. 111, 114 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838) (holding that a dedication of land
to the public, even "if not perfect, the previous user had given the public an inchoate right
which ripened and became absolute by the continued user during the life estates"); Whittington v. Christian, 23 Va. (2 Rand.) 353, 371 (1824) (recognizing that a person holding
only an "inchoate right, by entry or survey, could [not] assert it at law against such legal
title" held by another); Willets v. Van Alst, 26 How. Pr. 325, 333 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864) (noting that a purchaser of land may acquire an "interest defeasible and inchoate," but "a
writing or conveyance was necessary" to perfect it under the law).
198
Evans v.Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872, 873 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (No. 4,564) (Marshall, Circuit
Justice).
199 Id. at 874.
200
Id. at 873.
201
Id.
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829).
202
203
Id. at 10.
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By 1850, the Supreme Court recognized the truism that an inventor was "vested by law with an inchoate right... which he may perfect
and make absolute by proceeding" to secure a patent under the patent statutes. 20 4 Courts also recognized the implications of recognizing
that a patent comprised a perfected title in property; one circuit court
instructed a jury that the "assignees [of a patent] become the owners
of the discovery, with a perfect title," and thus "[p]atent interests are
'20 5
not distinguishable, in this respect, from other kinds of property.
It was a widespread judicial practice to invoke these fundamental concepts in real property law throughout nineteenth-century patent law
decisions.

20 6

Nineteenth-century courts ultimately recognized these perfected
legal titles in patents, secured as privileges, as analogous to traditional
common law property rights. This was implicit in Sargeant's successful argument in Pennock, in which he analogized an inventor's discovery to "an inchoate right to land,"20

7

but courts also made such

themselves. 20 8

connections
In assessing whether a patent licensee
could further convey his interests in the patent, for instance, one
court noted that this "privilege" was similar to "a right of way granted
to a man for him and his domestic servants to pass over the grantor's
land," citing a litany of real property cases from classic common law
authorities, such as Coke's Institutes, Coke's Littleton, Viner's Abridg204 Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 493 (1850).
205 Carr v. Rice, 5 F. Cas. 140, 146 (C.C.S.D.N.Y 1856) (No. 2,440).
206 See Henry v. Providence Tool Co., 11 F. Cas. 1182, 1186 (C.C.D.R.I. 1878) (No.
6,384) (Clifford, CircuitJustice) (noting that extension rights provided in the 1836 Patent
Act "were inchoate rights under the law"); Emmons v. Sladdin, 8 F. Cas. 681, 683 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1875) (No. 4,470) (recognizing that an inventor can "perfect and make absolute" his
"inchoate right" in his invention by "proceeding in the manner which the law requires" in
securing a patent); Hoeltge v. Hoeller, 12 F. Cas. 289, 289 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1870) (No.
6,574) (observing that plaintiffs "have but an inchoate right" given that their "patent is still
pending in the patent office"); Hoffheins v. Brandt, 12 F. Cas. 290, 298 (C.C.D. Md. 1867)
(No. 6,575) (recognizing that a patentee can "sell her inchoate right to a renewal" under
the 1836 Patent Act); Ellithorp v. Robertson, 8 F. Cas. 562, 567 (C.C.D.C 1858) (No. 4,409)
(recognizing that an inventor may "perfect his inchoate right by patent"); Hill v. Dunklee,
12 F. Cas. 151, 154 (C.C.D.C. 1857) (No. 6,489) (noting that at time of conception, an
invention is "an inchoate right" that an inventor may "perfect, and make absolute by proceeding to mature it in the manner which the law requires"); Clum v. Brewer, 5 F. Cas.
1097, 1102 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 2,909) (Curtis, Circuit Justice) (noting that "perfection" in a patent represents the "completion" of the "inchoate right" created by the act of
invention); Case v. Redfield, 5 F. Cas. 258, 258 (C.C.D. Ind. 1849) (No. 2,494) (noting that
patent extensions are based on policy "to compensate [the inventor] for his expenditures,
labor and ingenuity in the invention, and in perfecting it" (emphasis added)).
207 Pennock, 27 U.S. at 10; see supra note 203 and accompanying text.
208 See, e.g., Chambers v. Smith, 5 F. Cas. 426, 427 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1870) (No. 2,582)
(analogizing to land sale as the basis for framing scope of patent rights);Johnson v. Onion,
13 F. Cas. 777, 778 (C.C.D. Md. 1870) (No. 7,401) (upholding the validity of a patent term
extension on the basis of Supreme Court cases construing real property instruments); Armstrong v. Hanlenbeck, 1 F. Cas. 1140, 1141 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1844) (No. 544) (relying on landlord-tenant cases and related common law rules governing real property).
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ment, and Bacon's Abridgement, among others. 20 9 Finally, Justice Story,
riding circuit, resolved one complicated patent assignment case by
looking to "strong[ ] analogous cases in equity" in which courts recognized the legitimacy of "the deeds" conveying land even if a "feoffment is stated without any averment of livery of seisin." 211 1 Today, one
rarely sees such feudal property rules beyond the confines of first-year
property casebooks!
In summary, nineteenth-century case law provides substantial support for Madison's declaration in The Federalist No. 43 that patent
rights were justified "with equal reason" as the labor-based property
justification for common law copyright. 2 1' Patents were indeed privileges-civil rights securing property rights. Circuit Justice Noah
Swayne succinctly summarized this historical understanding of patents
in jury instructions in an 1869 patent infringement trial:
The rights secured by a patent for an invention or discovery are
as much property as anything else, real or incorporeal. The titles by
which they are held, like other titles, should not be overthrown
upon doubts or objections .... This principle should be steadily

borne in mind by those to whom is intrusted the administration of
2 12
civil justice.
It is undeniable, of course, that there were jurists who agreed
with Jefferson that patents were merely special, limited monopoly privileges. 2 13 Unfortunately, modern scholars and jurists myopically focus
on those cases, creating thereby the historical myth that is theJefferso209
Brooks v. Byam, 4 F. Cas. 261, 268-70 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843) (No. 1,948) (Story, CircuitJustice); cf Pennock, 27 U.S. at 16 (Story,J.) (analogizing an inventor's public use of an
invention prior to applying for a patent to a land owner's dedication of an "easement to
the public" with a similar "permanent right of user" by the public).
210 Dobson v. Campbell, 7 F. Cas. 783, 785 (C.C.D. Me. 1833) (No. 3,945) (Story, Circuit Justice). In this case, Circuit Justice Story was required to assess whether the assignment "set[ ] up a tite to the patent right" sufficient to support a claim for infringement by
the plaintiff-assignee. Id. The sticking point was that the assignment was not recorded
with the Secretary of State, as required by the 1793 Patent Act. See Patent Act of 1793, § 4,
1 Stat. 318, 322 (repealed 1836). Invoking the equity cases upholding real property interests transferred without the requisite legal formalities, Circuit Justice Story held that assignee had sufficient legal interest to sue for infringement. Dobson, 7 F. Cas. at 785.
211
See supra Part I.B.1.
212 Blandy v. Griffith, 3 F. Cas. 675, 679 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1869) (No. 1,529) (Swayne,
Circuit Justice). Circuit Justice Nathan Clifford would similarly remark in 1873:
Inventions lawfully secured by letters patent are the property of the inventors, and as such the franchises and the patented product are as much entitled to legal protection as any other species of property, real or personal.
They are indeed property, even before they are patented, and continue to
be such, even without that protection, until the inventor abandons the
same to the public ....
Jones v. Sewall, 13 F. Cas. 1017, 1020 (C.C.D. Me. 1873) (No. 7,495) (Clifford, Circuit
Justice), reu'd on other grounds, 91 U.S. 171 (1875).
213 See, e.g.,
Livingston v. Jones, 15 F. Cas. 669, 674 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 8,414)
(Grier, Circuit Justice) (referring to a patent as securing "the monopoly of use of a pat-
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nian story of patent law. 2 14 It is time the complete historical record is
uncovered, recognizing the palpable influence exerted by the social
contract doctrine and the labor theory of property on the evolution of
the American patent privilege-a civil right securing a property right.
C.

The Nineteenth-Century Expansion of Patent Privileges

In addition to invoking property rhetoric, doctrines, and policies
in nineteenth-century case law, courts also treated patents as privileges
in other important procedural and substantive respects. As patents
were privileges, courts expansively promoted these civil rights in property, treating them like other property and contract privileges justified
by the same natural-rights policies. As this Section explains, courts
provided patents with expansive procedural guarantees, adopting canons of liberal construction for both patents and the patent statutes.
Furthermore, Congress (with support from the Supreme Court)
adopted expansive substantive patent doctrines, such as patent term
extensions. In sum, antebellum courts and legislators treated patents
quite differently from traditional legal monopolies granted to American citizens, such as bridge franchises, which indeed were viewed with
suspicion and which courts narrowly construed against the grantee.
1.

The Expansive Construction of Patent Privileges by Courts

In accord with the widespread recognition of patents as privileges, courts adopted expansive and liberal canons in construing both
patents and the patent statutes. Today, section 282 of the 1952 Patent
Act mandates the liberal construction of patents, 21 5 which is justified
on the ground that the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) only
grants those patent applications that meet the statutory patentability
requirements. 2 16 This examination system was put into place by the
1836 Patent Act, 217 and thus scholars today believe that this is when
ented machine"); Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1020 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568)
(Story, Circuit Justice) (referring to a patent as a "monopoly").
214
See supra Part I.B.
215
35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) ("A patent shall be presumed valid."); see Am. Hoist & Derick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (discussing legislative intent behind the enactment of § 282 in the 1952 Patent Act).
216
See, e.g.,
Intervet Am., Inc. v. Kee-Vet Labs., Inc., 887 F.2d 1050, 1054 (Fed. Cir.
1989) ("The presumption of validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282 carries with it a presumption
the examiner did his duty and knew what claims he was allowing."); Am. Hoist & Derrick Co.,
725 F.2d at 1359 (noting that § 282 is based on "the basic proposition that a government
agency such as the then Patent Office was presumed to do its job").
217
See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (repealed 1870) (providing that
"on the filing of any such application ... the Commissioner shall make or cause to be
made, an examination of the alleged new invention or discovery").
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courts began to apply the presumption of validity for all issued patents. 2 18 This assumption is untrue.

Although there was no examination system between 1793 and
1836,2 19 it was during this period that courts adopted the presumption
favoring liberal construction of patents. For example, in 1827, Chief
Justice Marshall, riding circuit, instructed a jury in a patent infringement trial that the patent was to receive "a liberal common sense construction."' 220 Four years later, Circuit Justice Henry Baldwin
instructed ajury in another patent infringement trial that they should
be "looking on [the patent documents] as a statement of the patentee's
right and title, [in which the jury] will overlook all defects in the mode
of setting it out."22 1 Thus, several years before the creation of the examination system, Circuit Justice Story announced the well-settled rule
that "[p]atents for inventions are not to be treated as mere monopolies odious in the eyes of the law, and therefore not to be favored; nor
' 222
are they to be construed with the utmost rigor, as strictissimijuris."
The courts expressly adopted a policy of treating patents as they
treated other property privileges, such as title deeds, which they con22 3
strued favorably to best secure these property interests.
218
See, e.g.,
2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.06[2] [a], at 5-759 (2005)
("After creation of the Patent Office in 1836 and implementation of the examination system, the courts recognized the presumptive validity of issued patents." (citation omitted)).
219
The 1793 Patent Act, however, provided that before the Secretary of State issued a
patent, the Attorney General would "examine[ ]" applications to determine if they were
"conformable to this act." Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (repealed 1836).
Contrary to this mandate, the Secretary of State adopted in practice a registration system in
which patents were issued without any prior examination whether they met the statutory
requirements. See To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS, supra note 117, at 250 ("As
long as the ministerial requirements were met and the fee paid, a patent would issue even
though it was known to be for unpatentable subject matter.").
220
Davis v. Palmer, 7 F. Cas. 154, 158 (C.C.D. Va. 1827) (No. 3,645) (Marshall, Circuit
Justice).
221
Whitney v. Emmett, 29 F. Cas. 1074, 1080 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1831) (No. 17,585) (emphasis added).
222
Ames v. Howard, I F. Cas. 755, 756 (C.C.D. Mass. 1833) (No. 326) (Story, Circuit
Justice). Justice Story further stated that courts should "construe these patents fairly and
liberally, and not to subject them to any over-nice and critical refinements." Id.; see also
supra note 32 and accompanying text (explaining howJustice Story's use of the term "odious" reflected a long-standing, customary condemnation of monopolies).
223
After the 1836 Patent Act created the examination system, courts still recognized
that the "liberal spirit in which the patent law ought to be construed in favor of honest
patentees" existed before 1836. Ex parte Dyson, 8 F. Cas. 215, 219 (C.C.D.C. 1860) (No.
4,228) (citing Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218 (1832)); see alsoJonesv. Merrill, 13 F.
Cas. 991, 992 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 7,481) (acknowledging the well-settled "liberal interpretation now accorded to patents"); Imlay v. Norwich & Worcester R.R. Co., 13 F. Cas.
1, 5 (C.C.D. Conn. 1858) (No. 7,012) (recognizing that "[p]atents are to be construed
liberally" so that the "rights secured are ... protected against any substantial violation");
French v. Rogers, 9 F. Cas. 790, 792 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851) (No. 5,103) (noting that "as inventors are rarely experts either in philology or law, it has long been established as a rule, that
their writings are to be scanned with a good degree of charity").
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Significantly, this pro-patent presumption was contrary to the
courts' concomitant treatment of franchises and other monopolies
granted to citizens by express statutory authorization. As early as
1797, the Supreme Court declared that a legislative "act ... being in
derogation of the common law, is to be taken strictly." 224 In the fa22 5
mous 1837 anti-monopoly case, Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,
the Court used this canon to narrowly construe the property rights
secured in a state-granted monopoly franchise in a bridge. 226 In fact,
227
Chief Justice Taney, the author of the Charles River Bridge opinion,
believed that a similarly restrictive canon should apply to patents.
Such beliefs were offered in dissents in patent decisions. 228 The antebellum courts' refusal to apply to patents well-established canons requiring strict construction of monopoly franchises further evidences
that patents were viewed as privileges-as civil rights securing property rights.
Consistent with their liberal construction of patent grants, antebellum courts also liberally construed the patent statutes in favor of
expansive patent rights. In 1832, for instance, the Supreme Court affirmed the Secretary of State's practice in permitting patentees to surrender mistakenly defective patents and obtain corrected "reissued"
patents. 2 29 Notably, the then-governing 1793 Patent Act did not empower the Secretary of State to grant reissued patents. Nonetheless,
the Court held that the patent "laws . . . ought, we think, to be con-

strued in the spirit in which they have been made," highlighting both
224

Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 365, 367 (1797); see also 3 NoRMvANJ. SINGER, STAT-

UTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 61:1 (6th ed. 2001) ("Statutes which impose duties
or burdens or establish rights or provide benefits which were not recognized by the common law have frequently been held subject to strict, or restrictive, interpretation.").
225 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
226 The Charles River Bridge Court affirmed a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
decision, which expressly rejected the franchise owner's claim that he should be given a
"liberal and extended construction of the charters" because this was "inconsistent with the
improvement and prosperity of the state." Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 24 Mass.
(7 Pick.) 344, 467 (1829), affd, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court concluded that it "ought... to adopt a more limited and restricted" construction of the franchise. Id. at 467-68. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed, and continued
thereafter to rely on Charles River Bridge to construe narrowly any "grant of certain privileges by the public, to a private corporation." Richmond, Fredericksburg, & Potomac R.R.
Co. v. Louisa R.R. Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 71, 81 (1851). The established "rule of construction" for such franchises was that "any ambiguity in the terms of the contract must operate
against the corporation, and in favor of the public." Id. (quoting Charles River Bridge, 36
U.S. (11 Pet.) at 544).
227 See supra note 58 (discussing Chief Justice Taney and the Charles River Bridge
decision).
228 See, e.g., Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 345 (1853) (Campbell, J.,
dissenting) (arguing in a dissent joined by ChiefJustice Taney against expansive infringement doctrines, as a patentee should be restricted to "exactly the limits of his invention."
(citation omitted)).
229 See Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 249 (1832).
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the progress of the useful arts and the "reward" secured to the inventor by the patent statutes.2 3 0° Several years later, Circuit Justice Story
was required to construe a private legislative act providing an inventor
with an extended patent term, in which he acknowledged his judicial
duty "to give validity to the present letters patent under the act."23 1 By

the mid-nineteenth century, the Supreme Court cited these earlier decisions in reaffirming its commitment to the canon that patents "are
to be construed liberally, in accordance with the design of the Consti23 2
tution and the patent laws of the United States."
Contrary to early American courts' restrictive treatment of "monopolies odious in the eyes of the law," 23 3 they embraced patents as

privileges, identifying them as important civil rights securing equally
important property interests. As one district court instructed a jury
"called to act on the subject of patents" in an infringement trial, the
jury members should "regard[ ] as unjust and against law" the theory
23 4
"that there can be no property in a discovery or an invention."
Consistent with this command, antebellum courts embraced liberal
and expansive constructions of both patents and the patent statutes
themselves-interpretative canons that survive in patent law to this
day-in order to properly secure this privilege.
2.

The Reissue Right

Antebellum courts not only expansively construed the property
rights secured under patents and the patent statutes-treating these
rights as privileges-they also extended additional rights to patentees

beyond those expressly authorized in the patent statutes. One such
example was the reissue right, which was discussed earlier in illustrat-

ing the courts' expansive construction of the patent statutes in favor
of patentees. 23 5 This judicial expansion of patent rights beyond those
expressly provided in the patent statutes reflected the courts favorable
treatment of patents as privileges.
Although patent statutes have secured a reissue right since
1836,236 the provenance of this valuable remedial right is found not in
230

Id. at 242.

23-1

Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 645, 646 (C.C.D. Mass. 1838) (No. 1,517). Ulti-

mately, Circuit Justice Story held that a judicial correction of the alleged mistake in the
statute would "depart from the intention of congress, manifested in the other parts of the
act." Id. at 648. Faced with this contradiction in the original act, he refrained from construing it in favor of the patentee. Id.
232 Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 341-42 (citing Grant, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 218;
Blanchard, 3 F. Cas. at 648).
233 Ames v. Howard, 1 F. Cas. 755, 756 (C.C.D. Mass. 1833) (No. 326).
234 Allen v. Hunter, I F. Cas. 476, 477 (C.C.D. Ohio 1855) (No. 225).
235
See supfra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
236
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 251-256 (2000); Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 13, 5 Stat. 117, 122
(repealed 1870). Congress adopted something akin to a reissue tight shortly after the
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Congress, but in the Supreme Court. Prior to 1836, the patent system
was governed by the 1793 Patent Act, which authorized the Secretary
of State to issue patents upon application by inventors. 2 37 Sometime
in the early nineteenth century, the State Department's Superintendent of Patents, Dr. William Thornton, 23 8 began permitting patentees
to surrender mistakenly defective patents, and issued to them corrected versions for the rest of the original patent terms. 239 Signifi-

cantly, Dr. Thornton acted without statutory authorization in granting
240
these "reissued patents."
This practice came to a head in a lawsuit between a patentee
armed with a reissued patent and defendants charged with infringement, reaching the Supreme Court in 1832 in Grant v. Raymond.241 In
Grant, the defendants (represented by Daniel Webster, who ironically
argued for expansive copyright rights based on the natural right to
property in Wheaton 242 ) attacked the reissued patent's validity, arguing
for a restrictivereading of the patent statutes. 24 3 The defendants maintained that the "statute makes no provision for any surrender, and the
issuing of a new patent, '24 4 and that in context of patent law, the "secretary has no power . . .except so far as authorised by statute.

'245

Given that it was "impossible to reconcile such a [reissue] proceeding
to the requisitions of the act, ' 246 the defendants believed that the reissued patent in this case was invalid. If the Court chose to disregard
the limited powers expressly provided to the Secretary in issuing patents, the defendants concluded, this would effectively amend the patent statutes, and "[t]he Court cannot add a new section to the
[patent] act." 24 7 This argument made sense only if the patent statutes
Supreme Court's 1832 decision in Grant v. Raymond, see Act ofJuly 3, 1832, ch. 162, 4 Stat.
559 (1832) (repealed 1836), but this proved untenable and was replaced by section 13 of
the 1836 Patent Act, which was the first statutorily authorized reissue right as it is known
today.
237
See supra note 219 (discussing the issuance of patents under the 1793 Patent Act).
238

See To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS, supra note 117, at 253-54 (discuss-

ing Secretary of State James Madison's appointment of Dr. Thornton to this new ministerial office).
239 See id. at 265-66.
240
Id. at 266.
241
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218 (1832).
242 See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
243 See 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 227.
244
245
246

Id.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 227.

247 Id. at 229 (emphasis omitted). The defendants (via Webster) continued in this
vein: "This would change the whole patent system. Its effects would be monstrous." Id. at
230. In saying this, the defendants identified the exact concerns about rent-seeking behavior that animate the Jeffersonian story of patent law. First, "[p]atentees would try their
claims under one specification; they might fail; and they would call it inadvertence, and try
another experiment." Id. (emphasis omitted). In other words, patentees would act strategically in manipulating the patent system to obtain exclusive rights for themselves at the
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secured special legal privileges granting monopoly franchises to
inventors.
In delivering the opinion for the unanimous Court, ChiefJustice
Marshall rejected the defendants' arguments wholesale. The Grant
Court admitted that, under the 1793 Patent Act, the Secretary of State
was merely "a ministerial officer," and that "the act of congress contains no words which expressly authorise the secretary to issue a corrected patent." 248

But the Court found such authorization in "the

general spirit and object of the law" in securing the "progress of useful
arts" and "the reward [for the inventor] stipulated for the advantages
derived by the public for the exertions of the individual."' 2 49 The
Grant Court waxed poetic in the patentee's favor: "That sense of justice and of right which all feel, pleads strongly against depriving the
inventor of the compensation thus solemnly promised, because he has
committed an inadvertent or innocent mistake." 250 In the face of an
explicit argument reflecting the basic tenets of the Jeffersonian story
of patent law, the Grant Court expressly approved an expansive reading of the rights secured by the patent statutes. Consistent with its
adoption of similarly expansive interpretative canons, the Court had
no qualms in treating patents substantively as privileges.
Following Grant and the codification of the reissue right in the
1836 Patent Act, courts seldom discussed the reissue right, but when
they did, they confirmed that this right was regarded as a valuable
privilege-a civil right secured under the same labor-desert policies
justifying all natural and civil rights to property. In 1868, for instance,
a district court extolled the virtues of the reissue right, noting how the
"privilege of surrender and reissue is .

.

. invaluable to inventors, for

without it they would often lose that protection for the offspring of
their skill and labor which it is the immediate object of all patent laws
to afford." 2 5 1 The court detailed how patents were often undermined
by simple drafting mistakes resulting in "a fatal or damaging error,"
which was then exploited by many people "devoted to assailing, circumventing or defeating them." 25 2 Given these heavy-handed attacks
public's expense. Second, and more important, the patentee took into "public use" what
was not actually secured under the (defective) patent grant; therefore, to permit a reissued
patent was to withdraw from the public domain an invention that "becomes public property and can never be resumed." Id. at 231. Given that concerns about monopolistic rentseeking behavior by patentees were submitted to the Grant Court, the Court's affirmance of
the reissue right is substantial evidence of its favorable view of patents as privileges-civil
rights securing fundamental property rights.
248
Id. at 241.
249
Id. at 241-42.
250
Id. at 242.
251
Blake v. Stafford, 3 F. Cas. 610, 612 (C.C.D. Conn. 1868) (No. 1,504).
252
Id.
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on patents, the court concluded that the "privilege of surrender and
253
reissue is, therefore, necessary for the protection of inventors.
Such technically precise references to the reissue right as a privilege-a civil right serving natural rights policies justifying protection
of a property right-were not uncommon. 254 In 1844, Circuit Justice
McLean, whose name is often invoked today as supporting the Jeffersonian story of patent law given his decision in Wheaton,2 55 embraced
the favorable treatment that patentees received in the courts, noting
simply that the Grant Court secured the reissue right prior to its statutory authorization in 1836.256 Moreover, even when a court voided a
reissued patent, such as when an inventor exploited the reissue mechanism improperly to expand the scope of the original patent, the
court reiterated the pro-patentee policies underlying this valuable
privilege. 25 7 As another mid-nineteenth-century court bluntly stated:
"[I]n the case of a reissue," the patentee's legal entitlement "is not of
2 58
grace, but of right. It is secured by the statute."
3.

Patent Term Extensions

The last, but certainly not least significant, evidence that patents
were privileges-civil rights securing important and valuable property
rights-is found in the prevalent congressional practice in extending
patent terms in the antebellum years, which courts consistently affirmed and endorsed on natural rights policy grounds. In fact, Congress expressly provided for seven-year term extensions in section 18
of the 1836 Patent Act. 259 This legislation represents the most striking

evidence of the historical myth perpetrated by the Jeffersonian story
Id.
See, e.g., Ex parte Ball, 2 F. Cas. 550, 552 (C.C.D.C. 1860) (No. 810) (discussing the
reissue right in the context of securing a patentee's rights against "pirates" (citing Grant, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) at 218)); Child v. Adams, 5 F. Cas. 613, 614-15 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1854) (No.
2,673) (discussing the reissue right and the Grant decision in securing "valuable inventions" for "meritorious patentees"); French v. Rogers, 9 F. Cas. 790, 792 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1851) (No. 5,103) (justifying the reissue right in part by canon favoring charitable constructions of patents). But see French, 9 F. Cas. at 792 (justifying the reissue right in terms of
"some benefit to be derived by the public").
255
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
256 Brooks v. Jenkins, 4 F. Cas. 275, 277-78 (C.C.D. Ohio 1844) (No. 1,953).
257
See Cahart v. Austin, 4 F. Cas. 997, 1000 (C.C.D.N.H. 1865) (No. 2,288) (Clifford,
Circuit Justice). CircuitJustice Clifford noted that the reissue right "was intended to remedy that evil" in which patents "had frequently been adjudged invalid ... from the insufficiency of the specification." Id. However, in voiding the reissued patent, Circuit Justice
Clifford reminded the patentee that "this privilege was not given ... in order that the
patent may be rendered more elastic or expansive," which was what had occurred in this
case. Id.
258
Ex parte Dyson, 8 F. Cas. 215, 219 (C.C.D.C. 1860) (No. 4,228).
259
See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 18, 5 Stat. 117, 124 (repealed 1861). Congress
repealed this provision in 1861 when it extended the standard patent term to seventeen
years. See Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 88, §§ 16-17, 12 Stat. 246, 249 (1861).
253
254
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of patent law, because recently scholars and lawyers have engaged in a
sustained study of the history of patent and copyright term extensions
(prompted by the Eldred litigation). 26o Yet, beyond cursory references
to the extension right in section 18, these historical studies fail to discuss this valuable privilege provided to patentees by Congress in the
26
organic patent statutes themselves. '
Unsurprisingly, in the 123 cases in the Federal Cases reporter involving 97 patents whose terms were extended, 2 62 courts repeatedly
identified the extension right codified in section 18 as a privilege. 263
In one case, Circuit Justice Woodbury revealingly contrasted the
"rights and privileges" secured under the patent statutes against a
"grant or privilege" secured in a single legislative act.2 64 CircuitJustice

Woodbury's conjunction of privilege and right, and his corresponding
disjunction of privilege and grant, confirms that "privilege" referred
to either a civil right justified under the social contract doctrine of
natural rights philosophy or to a special governmental grant to an individual contrary to natural or common law rights. It is equally clear

260
The petitioner in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), failed in his constitutional
challenge to the 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827,
2827-28 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302 and 304 by extending copyright terms prospectively
and retroactively). See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing Eldred and the role
of the Jeffersonian story of patent law in this copyright case).
261
See, e.g., WALTERSCHEID, supra note 12, at 283-84 (stating only that the 1836 Patent
Act authorized "an administrative mechanism for term extension for seven years" and
quoting the statutory provision); Ochoa & Rose, supra note 12, at 929 n.119 (identifying
section 18 in a footnote without any further explanation); Tyler T. Ochoa, Patentand Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution:A HistoricalPerspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y USA
19, 51-109 (2002) (providing the most extensive extant analysis but failing to discuss in
any depth section 18 of the 1836 Patent Act and its resulting case law); Edward C. Walterscheid, InventorEquity: The Casefor Patent Term Extension, 86J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y
599, 601 (2004) (stating only that "the 1836 Act now provided an administrative mechanism for term extension of seven years which did not require a private act of Congress");
Edward C. Walterscheid, The Remarkable-and Irrational-DisparityBetween the Patent Term
and the Copyright Term, 83J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 233, 254-55 (2001) (devoting
only one page to discussing patent extensions and citing a single case in which a patent
term was extended).
262 Federal Cases patent case database on file with the author.
263
See, e.g., Blanchard v. Haynes, 3 F. Cas. 628, 628 (C.C.D. N.H. 1848) (No. 1,512)
(Woodbury, Circuit Justice) (adjudicating a patent extended by special legislation in the
context of discussing the "rights and privileges thereby created" by the patent statutes generally); Brooks v. Bicknell, 4 F. Cas. 247, 250 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 1,944) (McLean,
CircuitJustice) (identifying the extension right as "[t]his privilege, or right").
264
Blanchard,3 F. Cas. at 628 (emphases added) (noting that the private act extending
Blanchard's patent term "contained no grant or privilege in favor of' his former licensee
who was now accused of infringement under the extended term); see also Cox v. Griggs, 6 F.
Cas. 678, 679 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1861) (No. 3,302) (discussing an inventor's "right and privilege" in engaging in "experiment and reasonable diligence" in perfecting an invention
before securing a patent); cf Nat'l Filtering Oil Co. v. Arctic Oil Co., 17 F. Cas. 1215, 1218
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 10,042) (quoting same from Cox).
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which sense he intended to apply to the "rights and privileges" se265
cured under the patent statutes.
If there were any doubts that the patent term extension right was
a privilege defined by natural rights philosophy and its social contract
doctrine, Congress and the courts made clear that this was the background context for this particular statutory privilege. Consistent with
Madison's claim that patents were justified "with equal reason" as
common law copyrights, 266 the 1836 Patent Act expressly justified the
seven-year extension on a labor-desert policy: if the patentee "failed to
obtain, from the use and sale of his invention [during the fourteenyear patent term], a reasonable remuneration for the time, ingenuity,
and expense" in creating the invention, he could obtain a seven-year
term extension. 2 67 In adjudicating a patent extended under this provision, Circuit Justice McLean reiterated this policy in securing for inventors the fruits of their inventive labors:
The policy of the statute is a benign one. Its design is to foster genius and reward merit. Nothing can be more notorious than the
poverty of great inventors .... This was known to the congress of
1836, and the above act [section 18] was provided to deal justly, if
not liberally, with inventors .... Some may call it a munificent act;
but with much greater propriety it may be denominated an act of
268
justice.
Shortly after CircuitJustice McLean uttered these words, the Supreme
Court affirmed the constitutionality of section 18, reiterating its laborrewarding policy that "the patentee may have his patent extended" on
the basis of having "only to show that he has not been reimbursed" for
269
his inventive efforts.
Courts not only promoted the labor-rewarding policy underlying
the term extension provision, they drew the logical connection with
the tangible property concepts and doctrines similarly justified by the
same labor-rewarding policy. CircuitJustice Clifford, for instance, recognized that the 1836 Patent Act established "not only an inchoate
right to obtain letters-patent.., but also a further inchoate right to have

Blanchard,3 F. Cas. at 628.
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 18, 5 Stat. 117, 125 (repealed 1860).
267
Brooks v. Bicknell, 4 F. Cas. 253, 255 (C.C.D. Ohio 1845) (No. 1,945). Similarly, in
268
instructing a jury in a patent trial about the requirements of section 18, Circuit Justice
Nelson stated that "if a patentee.., can satisfy the commissioner of patents that he has not
been remunerated by the profits of his invention," then "it is the duty of that officer to
extend the term ... [to ensure] a reasonable compensation for his genius and his labor."
Blanchard v. Beers, 3 F. Cas. 617, 617 (C.C.D. Conn. 1852) (No. 1,506).
269
Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646, 690 (1846); see also Blanchard,3 F. Cas. at
617.
265
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In both situations-applying for a patent and

obtaining a term extension-the inventor perfected his right by securing it as a privilege. Circuit Justice Clifford admitted that "the title of
an inventor to an extension" rests on the "condition" that he fail to
secure the fruits of his labors, but this condition "does not change the
nature of the right."27' The extension right was an important privi-

lege securing a property right in the fruits of an inventor's labors.
Furthermore, in adjudicating this right, courts applied the same liberal canon used to secure other patent and property rights, 272 holding
that inventors who failed to profit from their inventions simply given
costs incurred in litigating their patents still had the right to obtain
2 73
term extensions.
Finally, it is well known that Congress provided individual patent
extensions long before the 1836 Patent Act codified this privilege and
that courts repeatedly upheld this congressional practice when these
extended patents were challenged in court.2 74 It is even more signifi-

cant that Congress continued to engage in this practice even after it
adopted the formal administrative proceeding in section 18 of the
1836 Patent Act.2

75

In several patent infringement trials involving

these extended patents, four Circuit Justices, including Justice Story,
declared that Congress had the constitutional "power, after a patent
270 Clum v. Brewer, 5 F. Cas. 1097, 1102 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855) (No. 2,909) (emphasis
added).
271

Id.

See supra Part III.C.I.
See, e.g., Allen v. Hunter, I F. Cas. 476, 476 (C.C.D. Ohio 1855) (No. 225); see also
Carew v. Boston Elastic Fabric Co., 5 F. Cas. 56, 57 (C.C.D. Mass. 1871) (No. 2,398) (holding that "although in express terms the eighteenth section of the act of 1836 only authorizes the grant of an extension to the patentee himself, the court has sustained the grant of
an extension to an executor or administrator" (citing Wilson, 45 U.S. (4 How.) at 646)).
274 See, e.g., An Act to Renew the Patent of Thomas Blanchard, ch. 213, 6 Stat. 589
(1834); An Act for the Relief of Oliver Evans, ch. 13, 6 Stat. 70 (1808). These extended
patents were challenged and ultimately upheld. See Evans v. Jordan, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch.)
199 (1815) (affirming Congress's private act extending the patent term of Oliver Evans
despite the Court expressing doubts as to the validity of Evans's patent); Blanchard,3 F.
Cas. at 628 (recognizing, in addition to this case, that "cases have frequently occurred" in
which "congress had [exercised its] constitutional right to confer a new and further term
on [a] patentee").
275 SeeAn Act for the Relief of Martha M. Jones, Administratrix of Samuel T. Jones, ch.
124, 15 Stat. 375-76 (1868); An Act for the Relief of John Goulding, ch. 88, 12 Stat. 904
(1862); An Act for the Relief of Thomas Blanchard, ch. 10, 9 Stat. 683-84 (1847); An Act
to Extend a Patent Heretofore Granted to William Woodworth, ch. 27, 6 Stat. 936-37
(1845); An Act to Amend, and Carry into Effect, the Intention of an Act Entitled, "An Act
to Renew the Patent of Thomas Blanchard," Approved June Thirteenth, Eighteen Hundred and Thirty-Four, ch. 14, 6 Stat. 748 (1839). These patents were also involved in litigation. See, e.g.,Jordan v. Wallace, 13 F. Cas. 1104 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1871) (No. 7,523) (involving
the patent extended for John Goulding);Jones v. Osgood, 13 F. Cas. 1002 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1869) (No. 7,487) (involving the patent extended for MarthaJones); Bloomer v. Gilpin, 3
F. Cas. 726 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1859) (No. 1,558) (involving the patent extended in 1845 for
William Woodworth).
272

273
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has expired, to provide for its extension." 2 76 This expansive view of
congressional power to secure patent rights-even when patented inventions had fallen into the public domain-was justified by the labor
theory of property that animated the definition of patents as privileges. As one court declared in a patent infringement trial in the
midst of the Civil War, "Congress has wisely provided by law that inventors shall exclusively enjoy, for a limited season, the fruits of their
inventions."' 277 The salience of the labor theory of property made
sense to Congress and courts because patents were privileges-civil
rights securing property rights.
Ultimately, much of the early evolution of American patent law
resulted from patents being treated as a civil right within the thendominant political and constitutional context of natural rights philosophy. It is important to bear in mind that not all congressmen and
jurists embraced a natural rights justification of patent privileges. As
always, the supporting sources for the Jeffersonian story of patent law
are there to be uncovered in any diligent search. 278 The historical
record is mixed, sometimes even within a single court opinion.
For instance, at the same time the Grant Court expansively construed the patent statutes in favor of patentees, it still employed rhetoric that supports the Jeffersonian story of patent law, declaring that
the "great object and intention of the [patent] act is to secure to the
public the advantages to be derived from the discoveries of individuals." 279 Such remarks, though, appear to have had no impact on Chief

Justice Marshall's decision in Grant, which expansively secured to patentees non-statutorily authorized rights in direct opposition to a claim
by a member of the public to the contrary. 28 0 Perhaps even more
noteworthy is that this contrasts with the cases in which the Court gave
276 Jordan v. Dobson, 13 F. Cas. 1092, 1095 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1870) (No. 7,519) (Strong,
CircuitJustice); see also Blanchard,3 F. Cas. at 628 (holding same); Blanchard's Gun-Stock
Turning Factory v. Warner, 3 F. Cas. 653, 657 (C.C.D. Conn. 1840) (Nelson, Circuit Justice) (holding same); Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 648 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 1,518)
(Story, Circuit Justice) (holding same).
Circuit Justice Strong also denigrated the idea that the public domain automatically
creates rights in individuals to use an invention at a certain time because, under the Constitution, the duration, expiration, extension, and recommencing of a patent term "is left to
the discretion of congress." Jordan, 13 F. Cas. at 1095. Circuit Justice Strong continued,
"Congress may be trusted, and they are trusted, to take care that in protecting the inventor,
the public shall not be injured." Id.
277 Clark Patent Steam & Fire Regulator Co. v. Copeland, 5 F. Cas. 987, 988
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 2,866) (adjudicating a patent extended under section 18 of the
1836 Patent Act).
278 See, e.g., Day v. Union India-Rubber Co., 7 F. Cas. 271, 275 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1856) (No.
3,691) (explaining, in the context of a discussion of the extension right, that a patentee's
exclusive privileges" serve "the ultimate benefit of the public, and [are] not for the sole
benefit of inventors and patentees").
279 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 243 (1832).
280 See supra notes 244-50 and accompanying text.
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doctrinal effect to such sentiments by strictly limiting state monopoly

28
franchises to secure the public interest. '
This Part sought to show both the influence of natural rights philosophy on American patent law and its determinative role in the
evolution of several patent doctrines. Some of these patent doctrines
remain in force today, such as the reissue right and the expansive interpretative canon courts employ when interpreting both patents and
the patent statutes. In this way, natural rights philosophy played an
important role, albeit hardly single-handedly, in defining and protecting patents as privileges in the early American republic.

IV
THE HISTORICAL PATENT PRIVILEGE REDISCOVERED:
28 2

IMPLICATIONS FOR TODAY

A proper intellectual history of American patent law has consequences on the legal and policy disputes surrounding patent and
other intellectual property rights today, especially given the omnipresence of the Jeffersonian story of patent law. A complete discussion of
these normative debates is beyond the scope of my thesis, which establishes only a descriptively accurate account of this intellectual history.
Thus, patent scholars and lawyers are still free to criticize expansive,
pro-patent developments in the law today. 28 3 At a minimum, though,
this Article establishes that they cannot continue to use the Jeffersonian story of patent law to do the descriptive heavy lifting in these
normative arguments.
For many years, lawyers and scholars have been claiming normative traction in their legal and policy arguments by invoking the Jeffersonian story of patent law. They have mixed modern policy
arguments with historical claims,2 84 and their most recent defeats in
Grokster and Eldred have not deterred them from continuing to advance a comprehensive critique of expansive protections for patent
and other intellectual property rights. As Paul M. Schwartz and William Michael Treanor recently wrote, "Eldred has not put an end to
'285
litigation in this area.
281
See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
282 Many thanks to Mark Lemley and Thomas Nachbar for calling attention to the
need for Part IV.
283
See supra notes 14-15, 21, 49 and accompanying text.
284 See supra notes 14-15, 18, 46-50 and accompanying text; see also Adam Mossoff, Is
Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 29 (2005) (describing how normative arguments
against copyright in digital media are predicated on descriptive, historical claims about the
nature of intellectual property fights); Oliar, supra note 120, at 1778 (noting simply that
"[i]ntellectual property scholars generally agree on the importance of history (and particularly the Framing history) to understanding the [Copyright and Patent] Clause").
285 Schwartz & Treanor, supra note 7, at 2362 (discussing Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F.
Supp. 2d 1215 (D. Colo. 2004)); see also Kahle v. Gonzales, 474 F.3d 665, 667 (9th Cir.
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This suggests two reasons to care about a proper intellectual history of American patent law. The first is doctrinal. The Court draws
heavily on the history of American patent rights as one of several factors in analyzing current patent doctrines. 28 6 For example, the Court
recently held that nineteenth-century patent rights, such as those discussed in Part III, constitute "the legitimate expectations of inventors
in their property." 287 As shown earlier, this identification of patents as
property itself reflects a long-standing historical treatment of patents in
both Congress and the courts. 28 8 If the Court assumes that this history
informs patentees' reasonable expectations today-a not-so-veiled reference to the constitutional protection of patents under takings
law28 9-it

behooves lawyers and jurists to better understand the na-

ture of these expectations and their supporting policy justifications.
The second reason is that a sound appreciation of the history of
American patent law matters so that scholars and lawyers are careful
not to use bad history as a substitute for careful normative policy arguments. For instance, Lessig's critique that the modern Court contra2007) (dismissing a constitutional challenge to both the 1976 Copyright Act and the Copyright Term Extension Act grounded in the "traditional contours of copyright" law);
Aharonian v. Gonzales, No. C 04-5190 MHP, 2006 WL 13067 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2006) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to copyright protection for software code); Brief of Economists and Legal Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4-5, KSR Int'l Co.
v. Teleflex Inc., No. 04-1350, 2006 WL 2452359 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006) (relying on Jefferson's
letter to McPherson, inter alia, as evidence that there has always been a "lack of natural
rights in inventions and [a] limited power vested in Congress" to legally secure inventions
in patents).
286 See supra notes 1, 3, 33-40 and accompanying text (discussing cases). Even when
the Court has not gone back as far as Jefferson's writings, it has relied on nineteenthcentury case law and treatises in adjudicating patent cases today. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841-42 (2006) (Roberts, C.J.) (emphasizing that
modem patent law should maintain fidelity to long-standing, nineteenth-century legal doctrines); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 738 (2002)
(affirming the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel in patent law given, in part, how
courts construed this equitable defense in the nineteenth century); Warner-Jenkinson Co.
v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 26 n.3 (1997) (maintaining that nineteenthcentury court decisions creating the doctrine of equivalents are controlling today despite
the litigant's argument that Congress's enactment of the 1952 Patent Act impliedly repealed these decisions).
287 Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 739. The Court further warned the Federal Circuit that it
must be cautious before adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of the
inventing community." Id.
288 See supra Part III.B.
289 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing in the context of regulatory takings doctrine that a property owner's
"reasonable expectations must be understood in light of the whole of our legal tradition");
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (identifying "investment-backed expectations" as a factor in assessing whether a government regulation results
in a compensable taking of property under the Fifth Amendment); see also Adam Mossoff,
Patents as ConstitutionalPrivateProperty: The Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings
Clause, 87 B.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2007) (examining substantial nineteenth-century case
law in which patents were secured under the Takings Clause).

2007]

REEVALUATING THE PATENT "PRIVILEGE"

1011

dicts its own "long history" in limiting patent and copyright is
profoundly mistaken, 290 as is the historical assumption that patents
and other intellectual property rights are being "propertized" today.2 9 1 The expansion in patent rights today is in accord with the

similarly expansive development in patent rights under the guiding
influence of natural rights philosophy in the early nineteenth century.
Modern developments in patent and copyright law may be criticized
on the basis of policy concerns, such as emphasizing monopoly costs
or championing the value of the public domain, but invocations of
history cannot serve as a proxy for such arguments.
Nor can scholars now claim that this history is moot to these modern debates. The legal realists reminded us that "[1]egal criticism is
empty without objective description of the causes and consequences
of legal decisions," 292 and many have adopted this motto in their own
critiques of intellectual property developments today. In sum, scholars and lawyers cannot have their cake and eat it, too. To reject as
irrelevant a historical record scholars have been relying on for years
raises the specter of Kramer's "law office history" critique-that lawyers only use history for supporting preconceived policy goals. 293 In

fact, the Jeffersonian story of patent law is an example of law office
history-it is an incomplete account of history in the service of modern policy arguments. In this respect, a proper intellectual history of
patent law indicates how labor theories of property and social contract
doctrines may continue to influence legal disputes and intellectual
294
property debates today.
CONCLUSION

Federal Circuit Judge Timothy Dyk recently remarked that
"[p] atent law is not an island separated from the main body of American jurisprudence." 295 This Article has endeavored to prove this principle by situating early American patent law within the political and
290 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
291
See supra notes 15, 49, and accompanying text. Lessig and others are not entirely to
blame, however, because the Court is responsible for creating the modern historical myth
that is the Jeffersonian story of patent law. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
292 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 849 (1935).
293
See Kramer, supra note 25, at 389-94 (complaining about the bad historiography of
lawyers, who produce "law office history" intended only "to generate data and interpretations that are of use in resolving modern legal controversies" (citations omitted)).
294
See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) (noting the "complementary" relationship between utilitarian and labor-desert policies as justifications for copyright); Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent Bargain Metaphor
After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315 (2004) (assessing the function of the social contract doctrine in modern patent law jurisprudence).
295
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Dyk, J., concurring).
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constitutional context of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuriesan era dominated by the labor theory of property and the social contract doctrine of natural rights philosophy. In such a context, patents
indeed were privileges-civil rights securing property rights. Of
course, the conception of patents as special, utility-enhancing monopoly privileges had its advocates in early American courts and among
public officials. It is not my purpose to suggest thatJefferson has been
misinterpreted, nor that his view of patents was atypical among his
contemporaries. Neither claim is true. The problem is the ubiquitous
approval of the Jeffersonian story of patent law today that results in
the same lopsided presentation and misinterpretation of the historical
record.
In reviewing primary historical sources in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, it is apparent that the Jeffersonian story of pat-

ent law is a historical myth. Judge Rich once criticized labeling patents as monopolies due to the negative "emotional" baggage that the
term "monopoly" carries with it.296 He recognized that "talk of the
'patent monopoly' weds patents to prejudice, which is not conducive
to clear thinking."2 97 The same must be said about the Jeffersonian
story of patent law, which weds American patents to English royal monopoly privileges, and thus masks the development of early American
patent law under the meaningful guidance of the social contract doctrine and the labor theory of property of natural rights philosophy.

296

Rich, supra note 23, at 239.

297

Id.

